

THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

SHOCK THERAPY: THE UNITED STATES ANTI-COMMUNIST
PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN IN FOURTH REPUBLIC FRANCE

By

SUSAN M. PERLMAN

A Thesis submitted to the
Department of International Affairs
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Degree Awarded:
Spring Semester, 2006

The members of the Committee approve the thesis of Susan M. Perlman, defended on February 10, 2006.

Max Paul Friedman
Professor Directing Thesis

Lee Metcalf
Committee Member

Michael Creswell
Committee Member

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

For my husband Todd, without whose love and support this would not have been possible, and for my parents Jim and Sandy McCall, who always encouraged me to go the extra mile.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Max Paul Friedman for agreeing to supervise this thesis. Dr. Friedman inspired me to write about U.S. foreign policy and provided me with the encouragement and guidance I needed to undertake and complete this endeavor. Moreover, he has been a true mentor, and has made my time at Florida State the most rewarding of my academic life. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Michael Creswell, who graciously agreed to preview portions of this text on numerous occasions. His expertise and insight on the European Defense Community proved invaluable to my understanding of the EDC as it related to the American anti-communist psychological campaign in France. I must also thank Professor Lee Metcalf, who not only fed my interest in international issues, but has been a valued mentor throughout my time in the International Affairs graduate program. She too provided an objective eye for this thesis, and this manuscript is much better for it.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their love and support throughout this process. My parents and my brother demonstrated overwhelming confidence in me and provided me with much-needed encouragement throughout my graduate studies. My husband has been both patient and understanding while I remained locked in our study for long hours working on this project. His support has been completely unwavering, and he has remained my staunchest ally and advocate during this entire undertaking.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
1. THE COMMUNIST THREAT	13
2. PSYWAR FRANCE	25
3. AMERICA'S ANTI-COMMUNIST AGENDA	41
4. THE FRENCH REACTION	63
CONCLUSION	94
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	105
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	116

ABSTRACT

This study examines the United States' anti-communist psychological campaign in France during the Fourth Republic. Students of the Cold War have often neglected this American "psywar" as playing a defining role in the Franco-American relationship in the early Cold War era. Rather, it is frequently treated as an aside in overall histories of postwar Franco-American relations. I argue that the American campaign itself proved to be a central factor that shaped U.S.-French relations in the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) and well into the years beyond. This campaign was not just a reflection of American desires to reduce the influence of communism in France; it was also part of a determined U.S. effort to secure support for American policies and initiatives in Europe in the face of the Soviet threat. American officials linked communism in France with obstructionism of U.S. policies and anti-Americanism. Consequently, the U.S. anti-communist psychological campaign both influenced and was driven by American Cold War imperatives. Indeed, had the French been more responsive to U.S. foreign policy overtures and initiatives, it is unlikely that the United States would have intervened to the degree that it did in French affairs.

The U.S. campaign came to permeate all aspects of French life and included American pressure on the French to adhere to U.S.-led foreign policy initiatives such as the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the European Defense Community (EDC), as well as related U.S. plans for a rearmed and reintegrated Germany. It also included American intrusions into French political and governmental processes as well as the labor movement. Finally, the American campaign sought to win French public opinion and mitigate the positive gains of Soviet peace initiatives through the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), information and educational programs, and mass media. All of these elements were linked to the others under the guidance of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), created by President Harry Truman in April 1951, with representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department, Department of Defense, United States Information Agency, and other interested parties. On January 31, 1952, the PSB approved PSB D-14c "Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France" which consolidated the various anti-communist efforts initiated under the

Truman administration and formalized the U.S. anti-communist psychological campaign in France.

Fourth Republic France, however, understood the communist threat within a much different set of circumstances than did the United States. Communists in France enjoyed enormous prestige born of their participation in the Resistance. Moreover, communists held government positions, ran the largest trade union, and generally appealed to a French population who feared being drawn into yet another world war. French geography alone demanded a cautious foreign policy. The French understood that their country would be the battlefield if a war should break out between the two Cold War giants. Indeed, the governments of the Fourth Republic had to ensure not only their own political survival; they also had to guarantee that the French Republic could survive the Cold War. Therefore, although the French remained firmly aligned with the West and were in general agreement with the United States on basic Cold War policy issues, the French forged their own path, and in doing so, sometimes disagreed with U.S. foreign policy concepts (or certain aspects of them) as they did with respect to the EDC, Germany, and the role of NATO. These governments did so, not out of anti-Americanism, or because they were weak on communism, but because the exigencies of France's own domestic and foreign policies required it.

In the end, the U.S. campaign failed to have the effect desired by U.S. officials. As the U.S. campaign intensified, the French of the Fourth Republic, who had been staunch U.S. allies and were anti-communist in their own right, became increasingly wary of U.S. intervention and sought more independence from the United States. Although the French remained generally aligned with U.S. policy in Europe, they did not do so unconditionally or with blanket acceptance of the American Cold War platform, and they sought to carve out a more independent and leading role for themselves in European affairs.

INTRODUCTION

“...Ideas and knowledge of great numbers of people are shaping the behavior and fate of governments and the course of societies more than ever before. Equally important, they are also shaping the relationships among nations.”¹

- Philip H. Coombs, Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs and former Ford Foundation Education Program Director

Soon after the cheers and jubilation of Victory in Europe Day subsided, a battered France began the task of rebuilding what had once been the most powerful nation in Europe. On October 13, 1946, the French adopted the constitution of the Fourth Republic, distancing themselves from the betrayal of Vichy and inaugurating a period of transition and governmental instability that would last until Charles de Gaulle returned to power and ushered in the Fifth Republic in 1958. Although buoyed by hope and optimism, this immediate postwar period in France also witnessed a growing French despair that the successive short-lived governments of the Fourth Republic would be unable to meet effectively the needs of the French people and nation. It was in this atmosphere that the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) enjoyed enormous popularity, capitalizing on a solid reputation forged in the Resistance. Perceived as an advocate for the working class, the PCF also benefited from its opposition to the unstable and seemingly ineffective governments of the Fourth Republic. In 1947, communist party membership was estimated to number over 800,000 in France.² In the 1951 national elections, 5 million out of a 19 million electorate voted for the PCF.³

Across the Atlantic, France’s long-time American ally also ushered in a new era, as it emerged from the Second World War as a global power. However, the afterglow of victory in World War II was as short-lived for the Americans as it was for the French, as a new “red” menace surfaced and Stalin’s Soviet Russia appeared poised to strike at Western Europe. As the American administrations of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower focused on the Soviet threat, the power of the PCF in France and its apparent subservience to the Soviet Union became all the more alarming. In private circles, American diplomats often referred to France as the new “sick man of Europe,” “needing shock therapy,” and “mentally ill.”⁴ The power of the French Communist Party, coupled with PCF opposition to American influence in Europe, fueled

American concerns that France would obstruct U.S. foreign policy initiatives for Europe. To American policymakers, France was the key to Europe and would be critical to any European bulwark against the expansionism of the Soviet Union. The Americans further believed that a weak France susceptible to communist intrigue and influence was unacceptable and could prove disastrous to American interests in Western Europe and to U.S. national security. Something had to be done. While the war-weary French struggled to rebuild their nation, U.S. officials in the late 1940s and the early 1950s secretly began to develop a comprehensive psychological campaign to strengthen French resolve in the face of communism and to win the “battle for men’s minds.”⁵ The Cold War had come to France.

This study examines the United States’ anti-communist psychological campaign in France during the Fourth Republic. Students of the Cold War have often neglected this American “psywar” as playing a defining role in the Franco-American relationship in the early Cold War era. Rather, it is frequently treated as an aside in overall histories of postwar Franco-American relations. I argue that the American campaign itself proved to be a central factor that shaped U.S.-French relations in the Fourth Republic and well into the years beyond. This campaign was not just a reflection of American desires to reduce the influence of communism in France; it was also part of a determined U.S. effort to secure support for American policies and initiatives in Europe in the face of a Soviet threat. American officials linked communism in France with obstructionism of U.S. policies and anti-Americanism. Consequently, the U.S. anti-communist psychological campaign both influenced and was driven by American Cold War imperatives. Indeed, had the French been more responsive to U.S. foreign policy overtures and initiatives, it is unlikely that the United States would have intervened to the degree that it did in French affairs.

The American anti-communist campaign in France was unprecedented--the United States had never before sought to interfere in the internal affairs of a traditional and long-standing Western ally. Similar parallels could and have been drawn with respect to U.S. policy towards Italy in the same era; however, the Italians had been U.S. adversaries less than five years before; the French were “friends” from the earliest days of the American Revolution. As a result, the U.S. anti-communist psychological campaign in France was highly delicate in nature. In public at least, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations skirted the issue of communism in France, choosing instead to highlight a more generic concern for Western Europe as a whole. Elsewhere, less traditional allies like Italy and Greece were trumpeted as ripe for communist machinations.

Although the power of communism in France was often decried in the pages of the U.S. newspapers like *The New York Times*, the fact that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations kept their concerns within the confines of the White House and the State Department suggests the great sensitivity of the U.S. campaign in France. The sensitive nature of this campaign is further evidenced by its noticeable lack of treatment in many publicly-released French diplomatic documents.

As U.S. officials and planners worked to develop a plan to reduce the power of communism in France, a unique program emerged, one that was designed to influence the internal and foreign affairs of an ally not through open hostility, but through a psychological campaign. This “psywar” was a reflection of a new “fourth dimension” of U.S. foreign policy focused on information, propaganda and cultural programs. It was also a part of what Gregory Mitrovich argues was a “more assertive than generally understood” U.S. national security doctrine to counter Soviet ideological and military expansionism by “measures short of war.”⁶ The U.S. campaign came to permeate all aspects of French life and included American pressure on the French to adhere to U.S.-led foreign policy initiatives like the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the European Defense Community (EDC), as well as related U.S. plans for a rearmed and reintegrated Germany. It also included American intrusions into French political and governmental processes as well as the labor movement. Finally, the American campaign sought to win French public opinion and mitigate the positive gains of Soviet peace initiatives through the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), information and educational programs, and mass media. All of these elements were linked to the others under the guidance of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), created by President Harry Truman in April 1951, with representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department, Department of Defense, United States Information Agency, and other interested parties. On January 31, 1952, the PSB approved PSB D-14c “Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France” which consolidated the various anti-communist efforts initiated under the Truman administration and formalized the U.S. anti-communist psychological campaign in France.⁷

This story, however, remains incomplete without the French themselves, for their internal situation and their reaction to the U.S. campaign were both causes and effects of the successes and failures of the U.S. program in France. The Fourth Republic engendered a chaotic multiparty political system in which no party received more than 28 percent of the vote and governments

had to be formed by coalition. This system of proportional representation thus enabled the participation of minority parties and made it easier for them to gain seats in the coalition governments. By the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1946, the two largest parties were the Communists on the extreme left and the Gaullists on the extreme right, both of which were in opposition to the Fourth Republic regime. Those moderate parties that supported the government, including the Socialists and Christian Democrats on the left and the Radical Party and Independents on the right were forced to make coalitions to “preserve democracy” and ensure the survival of the Fourth Republic. The Communists and the Gaullists opposed many American initiatives, and the U.S. government thus supported the more moderate centrist parties that it believed would be more receptive to the dictates of American foreign policy.⁸ However, U.S. officials agreed that even de Gaulle would be preferable to the PCF.⁹ The internal situation in Fourth Republic France thus complicates any analysis of the French reaction to the American campaign. There were twenty successive governments from 1947-1958 of varying political affiliations and stances on domestic and foreign policy issues. Furthermore, within each of those governments, there were distinct elements that also entertained different conceptions of U.S. foreign policy and initiatives.

Nevertheless, the governments of the Fourth Republic did have some consistent similarities. These governments were not determined to obstruct U.S. initiatives, nor were they particularly “soft” on communism. French officials were greatly concerned by the influence and power of the PCF and its apparent subservience to Soviet direction. Indeed, as this thesis shows, French politicians of this era were decidedly anti-communist and even took measures independent of the United States to reduce PCF influence. These measures included, among other things, the removal of communists from sensitive government positions, efforts to weaken the communist-dominated Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) trade union, and the creation of their own anti-communist propaganda organization, “Paix et Liberté.”

Fourth Republic France understood the communist threat within a much different set of circumstances than did the United States. Communists in France enjoyed enormous prestige born of their participation in the Resistance. Moreover, communists held government positions, ran the largest trade union, and generally appealed to a French population who feared being drawn into yet another world war. French geography alone demanded a cautious foreign policy. The French understood that their country would be the battlefield if a war should break out between

the two Cold War giants. Indeed, the governments of the Fourth Republic had to ensure not only their own political survival; they also had to guarantee that the French Republic could survive the Cold War. Therefore, the French forged their own path, and in doing so, exercised their right as a sovereign nation to disagree with U.S. foreign policy concepts (or certain aspects of them) as they did with respect to the EDC, Germany, and the role of NATO. These governments did so, not out of anti-Americanism, or because they were weak on communism, but because the exigencies of France's own domestic and foreign policies required it.

Although the American anti-communist psychological campaign itself has not been treated extensively in literature, my findings support some broader themes that have emerged in the historiography of Franco-American relations in the Cold War. The first regards why the United States intervened to the degree that it did in French affairs in the immediate postwar era. This study reflects Irwin Wall's argument in *The United States and the Making of Postwar France* that the Americans intervened in France because of their "paranoia over French communism, 'the main enemy,' fear of which became the source and inspiration of so much of Washington's policy throughout the postwar years."¹⁰ While Wall's statement is a central argument of this thesis, it is also important to take the argument a step further and to understand why the Americans were so afraid of French communism. The answer lies in PCF opposition to an anti-Soviet American foreign policy which was inherent in the various initiatives the United States proposed for Western Europe as a whole, and France in particular, in the immediate postwar era.

It was not, then, a Wilsonian attempt to ensure that France survived the immediate postwar era as a democracy, although that was an objective for U.S. programs there. Nor was the campaign an overall effort to ensure U.S. access to primary materials and French markets as some French officials then argued and New Left revisionists have since contended. As Chiarella Esposito in *America's Feeble Weapon* points out, American anti-communist "strategic-ideological priorities led the Truman Administration to support cabinets whose economic policies furthered systems quite different from the one that...the United States was trying to transplant into Western Europe."¹¹ Esposito further contends that this "anti-communist, strategic-ideological imperative" was important enough to the United States that it often subverted its own priorities to ensure continuity of the anti-communist agenda.¹² Nor was it necessarily an expression of masculine U.S. leadership over a weaker, feminized France, as expressed by Frank

Costigliola.ⁱ Instead, this study reflects a post-Revisionist argument that the American campaign was a reflection of U.S. international strategic concerns.¹³

This study also supports the broader themes of continuity and French agency.ⁱⁱ The governments of the Fourth Republic did provide a basis and continuity for Charles de Gaulle's later defiance of American dominance while France charted an increasingly independent path from the United States. De Gaulle was not the first to challenge American foreign policy initiatives; it can be argued that his return to power was at least partially a culmination of the Fourth Republic's drive to reclaim its sovereignty in foreign and domestic affairs from the Americans. In addition, Fourth Republic France demonstrated an understanding of the vagaries of U.S. foreign policy and sought to use the American preoccupation with anti-communism to its advantage. The United States did, for example, succumb to at least some French attempts to tie aid requirements to their ability to follow an anti-communist agenda along American lines.¹⁴

Where the French demonstrated their agency most, however, was in their refusal to accept a blanket American anti-communist platform and their decision to instead examine each initiative individually and to make decisions based on the necessities of France's, not America's, domestic and foreign policies. Indeed, Esposito's contention that the French were consistently able to maintain "an independent position vis-à-vis the American superpower" is central to my appraisal of the French reaction to the overall campaign.¹⁵ And contrary to Michael Harrison's suggestion that the French were largely frustrated in their attempts to amend or change U.S. initiatives until de Gaulle returned to power, the Fourth Republic did successfully navigate the dangerous gulf between the American and Soviet giants.¹⁶ As Alan Milward suggests in *The Reconstruction of Western Europe* and William Hitchcock argues in *France Restored*, the French time and again "proved capable of subverting Washington's goals...to pursue French national interest."¹⁷

ⁱ Frank Costigliola, in *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance*, argues that the United States perceived France as feminine, and in need of the firm, masculine hand of the United States to guide her.

ⁱⁱ Both Irwin Wall, in *The United States and the Making of Postwar France*, and William Hitchcock, in *France Restored*, make the argument that the French were active, rather passive, participants in their relations with the United States during the Fourth Republic. Hitchcock and Michael Harrison, in *The Reluctant Ally*, further argue that de Gaulle's Fifth Republic was not a break from a weaker, unstable Fourth Republic, but instead a reflection of continuity with the Fourth Republic and the measures French governments took to assert more independence from the United States.

Finally, although this thesis argues that the French were able to resist American pressure and forge their own “path” between the superpowers, it also supports the contention that the French were not as far apart from the Americans as many U.S. officials in the Cold War era had believed. In contrast to Frank Costigliola’s assertion that the United States and France were “allies that [were] often coldly apart because of policy differences,”¹⁸ Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, in “France and the German Question, 1945-1955” make the convincing case that the French were closer to the United States on fundamental issues than has previously been acknowledged.¹⁹ⁱⁱⁱ However, what is important for this study and helps explain the U.S. anti-communist psychological campaign in France is that American officials at that time *perceived* an element of obstructionism on the part of the French, whether it emanated directly from the government or was a reflection of French public opinion or PCF propaganda. The fact that the French government really was in line with basic U.S. foreign policy objectives shows just how little the United States understood of the French situation, and may at least partly account for the ultimate failure of the campaign.

In the immediate years following the end of the Second World War, France, so devastated by the war and eager for American financial and material assistance was generally supportive of U.S. policies. However, as the U.S. anti-communist campaign in France intensified, so too did France’s resentment of U.S. intervention. The French grew increasingly tired of American attempts to dictate foreign policy, the lack of U.S. support for France’s policies in the overseas dominions of the French Union, and of American intervention in domestic affairs. By the time the Fourth Republic drew to a close, U.S. relations with France had appreciably worsened while successive French governments increasingly asserted independence from U.S.-led endeavors and the French public grew more and more in favor of neutralism in the Cold War. As Wall argues, “Although Washington had influence...it could rarely have its way.”²⁰

There are lessons to be learned from U.S. relations with Fourth Republic France that may be applied even today. Specifically, an intervention of any nature (covert or overt) in the affairs of a sovereign, much less allied, nation is always perilous. The United States anti-communist psychological campaign was a central factor that conditioned Franco-American relations

ⁱⁱⁱ Marc Trachtenberg, in *A Constructed Peace*, also indicates that the “substantive differences” between the United States and France “were not nearly as great as they appeared at the time.” (p. 69)

throughout the whole of the Fourth Republic and set a diplomatic tone that would resonate well into the 1960s. Indeed, the growing popularity of neutralist sentiment and a surging desire to exert independence from the United States, arguably may have paved the way for the return of Charles de Gaulle. Now fifty years later, we continue to see the effects of strained U.S. - French relations born in the tumultuous years of the Fourth Republic.

The next chapter will set the scene for the American intervention in France under the guise of anti-communism and includes a discussion on the power of communism in France, the French Communist Party's link to the Soviet Union, and the important role that anti-communism played in the formulation of American policy toward France. Chapter 2 provides background for the then new domain of *peacetime* psychological operations and traces the evolution of the American psychological operations plan for France into a key determinant of Franco-American relations during the Fourth Republic. Chapter 3 details the American campaign formalized under PSB D-14c "Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France," and explores the campaign as it permeated every aspect of U.S. relations with France, ranging from the economic, labor, governmental, and national defense arenas, to cultural programs designed to win over French public opinion. Chapter 4 examines the French reaction to American interference. Finally, the Conclusion assesses the American anti-communist psychological program and considers how French public opinion of the United States had evolved by the end of the campaign.

Finally, a word must be said on the inherent difficulties encountered in writing a history of something as sensitive as U.S. psychological operations in France. The declassification of some key documents provides valuable insight into the psychological programs of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. However, many documents remain locked away in U.S. government vaults that could shed an even more definitive light on the U.S. anti-communist campaign. The same is true for the oft-neglected French side, as there is a dearth of released French government documents that even acknowledge the American campaign, much less provide an indication of how affected French views about the United States and what impact it had on France's foreign policy. This lack of documents often requires a heavy reliance on the public and private commentaries and words of those who were a part of the Fourth Republic governments. This being said, there is still enough information to develop an accurate picture of the American anti-communist campaign in France during the Fourth Republic, the French reaction, and the impact it had on Franco-American relations. It is my hope that this thesis will

add insight to a discussion of the U.S.-French relationship during this era, as well as the Cold War as a whole.

¹ Philip Coombs, *the Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 14.

² Jacques Fauvet, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Francais, II Vingt-Cinq Ans de Drame, 1939-1965* (Paris : Fayard, 1965), 215.

³ U.S. Department of State, *Intelligence Report No. 6140: The French Communist Party: Its 1952 Record and Prospects for 1953*, December 30, 1952, <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>, 3.

⁴ Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance, 1940-1990* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), 101.

⁵ Frances Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2000), 2.

⁶ Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 2.

⁷ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c: Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France*, January 31, 1952, <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

⁸ Irwin Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 2-3.

⁹ Costigliola, 65.

¹⁰ Wall, 300.

¹¹ Chiarella Esposito, *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994), xxv.

¹² Esposito, xxi.

¹³ Mitrovich, 179.

¹⁴ Wall, 5.

¹⁵ Esposito, 207.

¹⁶ Michael Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 45.

¹⁷ William Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 8, and Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951* (London: Methuen & Co., 1984), xvi.

¹⁸ Costigliola, xv.

¹⁹ Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, "France and the German Question," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, No. 3 (Summer 2003): 14.

²⁰ Wall, 3.

CHAPTER 1: THE COMMUNIST THREAT

*“Le peuple de France ne fera pas, il ne fera jamais la guerre à l’Union Soviétique.”*¹ⁱ
- Parti Communiste Français Politburo, 30 September 1948

Just three short years after the end of World War II, the European landscape was again divided, not by the battle lines of the Ardennes or Normandy, but by the dawning Cold War and the confrontation between the Soviet-dominated East and the American-led West. In the West, a deep-seated fear of fascism was soon replaced by growing concern with militant communism. In response, officials in Western Europe and the United States slowly realized that a war of ideas, not armed hostilities, would be fought and won well before the first shot could be fired in a global “hot” war. In the East, Stalin’s Soviet Union had been “quick to grasp the potential of the wide-spread instability of postwar Europe... [and] had deployed a battery of unconventional weapons to nudge itself into the European consciousness and to soften up opinion in its favor.”² In doing so, the Soviets were the first to attempt to win the “battle for men’s minds” in the new Cold War.

The Red Menace

The United States had good reason to fear Soviet power and expansionism during these immediate postwar years. Eastern Europe had come under Soviet domination and lived behind an “Iron Curtain” that had descended over the European continent. In China, Mao Zedong’s communist forces had overcome Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang to assume power in 1949. That same year the Soviets exploded an atom bomb ending the American monopoly on atomic weapons. In 1950, the Soviets supported their maverick North Korean proxies in their fight against South Korea and its American allies.³

However alarming these events were to the United States, equally disturbing were Soviet attempts to ideologically infiltrate Western Europe in order to expand its base of communist “fellow travelers” and to win sympathizers for Soviet foreign policy initiatives. In an attempt to divide the Western allies and to expose the United States as culturally barren and its foreign

ⁱ “The people of France will never ever wage war on the Soviet Union.”

policies as brinkmanship politics, the Soviets launched a “Peace Offensive” designed to appeal to those in Western Europe who feared a third global war and to demonstrate Soviet flexibility in the face of rigid American anti-communism.⁴ This offensive included, among many other facets, the creation of a vast number of communist “fronts” throughout the West (and especially in France) which targeted the media and the population at large.⁵ In 1950, the Soviets sponsored the “Stockholm Appeal” for nuclear disarmament. The Appeal called for the complete prohibition of the atomic bomb and demanded that any country that used such a weapon be labeled a war criminal. With the Stockholm Appeal the Soviets hoped to portray the United States, which until 1949 enjoyed a monopoly on atomic weapons, as an aggressor nation compared with the Soviet Union’s own peace crusade. Moreover, the Stockholm Appeal provided the Soviets with the chance to recruit new fellow-travelers into the communist movement.⁶ Nowhere was this initiative more welcomed than in war-weary France, where communists gathered 15 million signatures in support of the Soviet-led appeal.⁷

The French Communists

The popularity of communism in France concerned U.S. officials almost immediately after the end of the Second World War. French communists played a critical role in the wartime Resistance against the Nazis which gave them “a powerful hand to play” in French postwar politics.⁸ Moreover, some of their opponents in the French Right had been disgraced by their collaboration with the wartime Vichy government. Until their dismissal from office in May 1947, there had been five communist ministers in the French government.⁹ The French communist party remained one of the largest outside of the Soviet bloc; yet despite its ministers’ expulsion from the government, the PCF continued to be a potent force in French politics. In July 1947, the PCF estimated its membership to total more than 800,000 members, which overwhelmingly eclipsed the second place Socialist bloc.¹⁰

The PCF also enjoyed a sophisticated network of party organs through which it spread communist propaganda effectively. This network included the newspapers *L’Humanité* and *Ce Soir* along with 75 other unofficial papers and 25 fellow-traveling magazines.¹¹ In addition, the PCF freely operated a variety of communist institutions created to encourage conversion to communism and indoctrinate new PCF sympathizers and members. These organizations included, among others, “Travail et Culture” and “Peuple et Culture” aimed at French workers, and the “École Centrale des Centres du Parti Communiste Française,” which trained future party

leaders. Perhaps the most pervasive of these organizations was the “Mouvement de la Paix,” which sponsored the “Peace Congress” in Paris in 1949 and made Picasso’s “Peace Dove” a mainstream anti-war image.¹² The “Mouvement de la Paix” was extremely popular, with over 50,000 supporters at its zenith and its own newspaper, *Action*.¹³ The PCF also had its own depository for communist funds, the French “Banque Commerciale de L’Europe du Nord,” in which Soviet state banks held almost all of the stock.¹⁴

Furthermore, the PCF demonstrated an unparalleled capacity to attract non-communist voters, earning a nationwide following and transgeographic appeal. Throughout the Fourth Republic, communist voters outnumbered PCF members almost ten to one.¹⁵ The PCF thus maintained a relatively stable electoral base during the late 1940s and into the 1950s, consistently receiving more votes than any other French political party, until a noticeable decline began to occur in 1958 with the return of Charles de Gaulle and the advent of the Fifth Republic.¹⁶

The PCF also benefited from an inside position within the French government and security services. After the Second World War, communists had been integrated into the ranks of the French police, military and Secret Services. For their part, U.S. intelligence officials were leery of their French counterparts, suspicions that dated back to the end of the war and intercepts of KGB “VENONA” messages indicating that French spies had passed intelligence to the Soviets.¹⁷ Many in the CIA also subscribed to the belief that French intelligence was nothing more than a “prostitute” for KGB operations in France. Moreover, there were purportedly as many as 50,000 communist agents secretly operating within the French metropole and another 50,000 paramilitary forces standing ready to incite and lead a communist uprising.¹⁸ In 1946, the Central Intelligence Group penned a “Memorandum for the President” on communist penetration into the nascent Fourth Republic government. The report cited communist “infiltrations” into key positions within the Ministries of Air, Armament, and Industrial Production. Additionally, the memo warned of communist infiltration of the French Air Force, the Army, and the Ministry of Veterans.¹⁹

In addition to the prevalence and clout of communists in the government, the PCF dominated the largest and most dynamic trade union in France, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), which solidified the communist hold over the French working class. Communist influence in the CGT provided the PCF a structure under which it could organize, including

office space and equipment, publications, and trade union contracts. Moreover, control of the CGT ensured the communists would have direct contact with the workers they claimed to champion and gave the PCF a platform from which to spread anti-government propaganda.²⁰ The PCF used its position of dominance within the CGT to criticize and rally opposition to Fourth Republic domestic policies while making its own claims for worker bonuses, family and student allotments, social security and other issues that were sure to appeal to the average Frenchman. The PCF, through the CGT, also engineered widespread labor strikes throughout the 1950s in which millions of Frenchmen were organized in protest of government policies.²¹

U.S. Foreign Policy and the PCF

When viewed within the context of the Cold War, the popularity of the PCF elevated the importance of France within the overall foreign policy of the United States and its anti-Soviet Cold War imperatives. Not only was communism threatening U.S. interests in Western Europe, it appeared to be inextricably linked to the Soviet Union. Many of its leaders, such as Maurice Thorez, who spent the war in Moscow, were handpicked by Soviet leader Josef Stalin himself to lead the French movement.²² In 1948, the PCF Politburo stated that it would never make war on the Soviet Union. The very next year Thorez declared that French communists would remain loyal to the Soviet Union even if it should cross French boundaries “in pursuit of the aggressors of the western imperialist block (sic).”²³ In 1950, Thorez suffered a stroke and received treatment in Moscow, which to the Americans was further evidence of a communist conspiracy.²⁴ Most telling of all was “la dévotion amoureuse” of the PCF leadership to the cult of Stalin:

We communists, whom the class enemy and its agents believe can be offended by calling us “Stalinists” repeat loudly, as we did 20 years ago, our pride in this title of honor and glory that we work hard to merit. With all of our heart, we proclaim our deep love for Stalin and we assure him of our unshakeable confidence.²⁵

Most troubling was PCF support for Soviet foreign policy positions and initiatives that opposed U.S. policy in Europe. The PCF protested vociferously against French participation in the Marshall Plan. Moscow itself, in spite of Poland and Czechoslovakia’s initial desire to participate in the Plan, had quickly rejected a Soviet role (or the participation of any its satellites) within the Marshall Plan and rallied its “fellow-travelers” against the American initiative. The PCF loyally followed suit and depicted the Marshall Plan as an “entangling and dangerous” alliance with the United States. Moreover, the PCF objected to the Marshall Plan on the nationalist grounds that it was a form of American imperialism in danger of supplanting

French industry.²⁶ The PCF attempted to appeal to small-scale farmers by charging that American agricultural aid distributed under the Marshall Plan would only benefit large-scale farmers and that importation of American farm goods would drive down French farm prices.²⁷

The Soviets also rejected the creation of a remilitarized Germany on their western flank. The PCF followed the Soviet lead, denouncing German rearmament as an aggressive American ploy to bring Western Europe to the brink of war. CIA reports further indicated PCF subservience to Soviet leadership on the German question and contained evidence that French delegates to the “European Workers Conference against German Rearmament” “received instructions from the director of Soviet Intelligence in charge of sabotage in Western Europe.”²⁸ Communist leaders also skillfully directed their critique of rearmament policy to a blue collar audience, arguing that the cost of German rearmament would absorb much of the billions of francs allocated to increasing worker wages.²⁹ This PCF anti-German rearmament campaign caught the attention of the Harry S. Truman administration; Truman himself routinely complained in private memos that the Soviets and their French “puppets” were blocking U.S. plans for a rehabilitated Germany.³⁰

Additionally, the PCF resisted most U.S.-led measures for European integration throughout the duration of the Fourth Republic. The Soviet Union opposed the creation of NATO, arguing that it was another manifestation of American aggression. The PCF argued against NATO, too and attempted to turn the French public against the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT). Reports emanating from the American Embassy in Paris often referred to a “violent and persistent Communist-inspired propaganda campaign against the NAT” and its related Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) with the object of “poisoning” and “confusing” French opinion on Western defense.³¹ In May 1952, the PCF organized embarrassing protests against NATO when the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Matthew Ridgway visited Paris. Additionally, French communists appealed to their working class base by arguing that the French government and the United States were preparing for war against the Soviets and that the Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Pact would impoverish an already suffering working class.³² Furthermore, French communists prepared to actively sabotage key elements in NATO defense. According to the CIA, the PCF was secretly planning to take control of the large French port of Brest, which was vital to Atlantic defense.³³ The PCF also agitated for the obstruction of MDAP shipments through work stoppages. Later in the Fourth Republic, French communists

continued to obstruct measures for European integration and demonstrated their overarching objective of “denying France to the Western Alliance” by aligning with the Gaullists in opposition to the European Defense Community.³⁴

Outside of the French metropole, the PCF continued to mirror Soviet foreign policy and to take stands on Fourth Republic colonial policy antagonistic to the French government and American attempts at a middle road. Although many in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations felt morally inclined to support independence for the French colonies, Cold War imperatives dictated a more nuanced policy. In Indochina, the United States, concerned about a drain on NATO forces for Europe and later a conflict on the Korean peninsula, urged the French to end the war quickly. The French government, for its part, wanted desperately to hold onto its colonial empire. The United States also subscribed to the domino theory as it related to Southeast Asia and worried that the fall of Indochina to communist forces could lead to trouble in India. Although the United States wanted the French to end the war, it was also imperative that they win the war. The Soviets and the PCF supported a complete French withdrawal from Indochina, which was unthinkable both to the Americans and the French government. Additionally, the PCF provided unqualified support for communist leader Ho Chi Minh and organized countless protests against French and U.S. actions in Southeast Asia, including numerous actions against the manufacture and shipping of war materiel for use in Indochina, North Africa or against the USSR.³⁵

In North Africa, the United States supported a gradual emancipation of the French colonies, in part out of fear that French repression would open the door to a communist alliance with North African nationalists. However, the United States needed its French allies and pursued a middle road designed to avoid alienating the French government and the Arab nationalists. While the French government struggled to maintain its Maghreb possessions, the PCF called for immediate autonomy for French North Africa, abolition of protectorate treaties and universal suffrage, an untenable position for both the French government and its American allies. The PCF also exploited the tense situation in North Africa by attempting to align with Arab nationalist leaders in a United Front in order to gain control of the area for Moscow.³⁶ The PCF provided further support to the nationalist cause via its extensive propaganda machine.³⁷

Furthermore, in addition to opposing U.S. policies, the PCF employed blatant anti-American rhetoric. The PCF consistently referred to all other political parties in France as “le

parti américain” and warned against the “enslavement of France by a foreign power.”³⁸ Maurice Thorez disdainfully referred to U.S. officials as “merchants and traveling salesmen of corned beef and chewing gum” who made no effort to hide their arrogance in formulating policy.³⁹ The PCF also focused its propaganda machine against American “imperialism.” In March of 1951, *France Nouvelle* printed anti-American fodder for use by PCF propagandists including statements that “The working class must be convinced...of the necessity to impose a peace policy and to liberate our country from the U.S. firebrands, for whom our ministers are ruining the people and creating misery.”⁴⁰ Moreover, this propaganda seemed to have the desired effect; a poll conducted by “Realités” magazine in early 1952 indicated that 56 percent of communist voters perceived the United States to be an aggressor, a major objective and victory for the PCF.⁴¹

The PCF and the Fourth Republic

American policymakers attributed the power and appeal of communism in France to a flawed French political system that rendered the Fourth Republic impotent in the face of a well-organized French communist movement. The PCF itself held a prominent position within this system, performing what Georges Lavau called a “tribune” function: protecting the rights of the average Frenchman against the empowered elites.⁴² The French political system during the Fourth Republic allowed them to do just that by allowing even fringe political parties to put forth ideological and social platforms without defining a specific program of action.⁴³ As a result, the PCF enjoyed the enormous popularity that came in part from its role as the main opposition to a weak French government and the fact that as an opposition party, it did not have to defend unpopular policies. The lack of unity on the part of non-communist French parties both perplexed and frustrated U.S. policymakers, who blamed these parties for not preventing communist inroads in France.⁴⁴ The power enjoyed by the communists within French politics only fueled the U.S. (and the Gaullist) belief that the Fourth Republic was unstable and dangerously susceptible to communist machinations. President Dwight Eisenhower referred to the Fourth Republic as a “hopeless, helpless mass of protoplasm.”⁴⁵ In February 1947, Dean Acheson, Truman’s secretary of state, summed up the United States’ worst fear:

In France, with four communists in the Cabinet, one of them Minister of Defense, with communists controlling the largest trade union and infiltrating government offices, factories, and the armed services, with nearly a third of the electorate

voting communist, and with economic conditions worsening, the Russians could pull the plug any time they chose.⁴⁶

U.S. officials also blamed the French government for not taking responsibility for many of the issues that plagued domestic harmony, such as price increases and for not explaining to the French people the cost of rebuilding France and Europe. They feared that a defeat of the sitting French government over price increases would “mark the general paralysis of the regime” and that “the Fourth Republic [was] leading France to her downfall.”⁴⁷ The U.S. administration further accused the French government of being “slow to recognize communist connivances” in numerous strikes and labor disputes, and for failing to bring about rapid political recovery, which could lead to the eventual “Sovietization” of France within a year.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, both Eisenhower and Acheson understood the strategic importance of a “Westernized” France. The French Union covered vast areas in Africa, Asia and Europe critical to a U.S. defense against the Soviet Union. Despite the frustration that U.S. officials felt towards their French ally, France’s communist “problem” only highlighted the significance of France within the context of the Cold War and the U.S. fight against Soviet communism. Determined to secure France as the hinge in an anti-communist bulwark and fearful of sitting idly by as France succumbed to a powerful communist lobby, American policymakers began to develop detailed plans to reduce the power and influence of communism in France. Mindful of the sensitivity of an “active” American intervention in metropole France, the United States embarked on a psychological campaign designed to win over French public opinion from Soviet-inspired communism; in doing so, the United States inaugurated what would become a pervasive and unparalleled anti-communist campaign for France that, for better or worse, would mold Franco-American relations throughout the Fourth Republic.

¹ Parti Communiste Français Politburo, as quoted in Fauvet, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Français*, 228.

² Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, 17.

³ Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How the Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Book, 1997), 64.

⁴ Pells, 65.

⁵ Saunders, 17.

⁶ Bernard S. Morris, "Communist International Front Organizations: Their Nature and Function," *World Politics* 9 (1956): 84. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu>.

⁷ Pells, 65.

⁸ Douglas Porch, *The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), 279.

⁹ Annie Kriegel, *The French Communists: Profile of a People*, trans. Elaine Halperin (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972) 379.

¹⁰ Fauvet, 215.

¹¹ Psychological Strategy Board, *Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Reduction of Communist Power in France (Code Name: Cloven/Midiron) Annex A*, November 1, 1951. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

¹² M. Aderath, *The French Communist Party, a Critical History (1920-84): From Comintern to 'the Colours of France*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 152.

¹³ U.S. Department of State, *Intelligence Report No. 6140*, 8.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Intelligence Report No. 6140*, 18.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Intelligence Report No. 6140*, 4.

¹⁶ Charles Micaud, *Communism and the French Left* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), 129.

¹⁷ Porch, 279.

¹⁸ Porch, 292-293.

¹⁹ Central Intelligence Group, *Memorandum for the President*. November 26, 1946, <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>, 1.

²⁰ U.S. Department of State, *French and Italian Elections*, July 6, 1951, <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>, 4.

²¹ Aderath, 153.

²² Andrew Knapp, *Parties and the Party System in France: A Disconnected Democracy?* (Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 103.

²³ As quoted in Jefferson Caffrey, "Despatch from the Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State," March 23, 1949, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Volume IV Western Europe* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1975), 636.

²⁴ Fauvet, 234.

²⁵ Jacques Duclos, as quoted in Fauvet, 259-260.

²⁶ C.L. Sulzberger, "French CP—The Party and the Line," *New York Times*, June 27, 1948. [www.lib.fsu.edu/Historical New York Times database](http://www.lib.fsu.edu/HistoricalNewYorkTimesdatabase).

²⁷ Robert Lovett, "Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France," April 23, 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948, Volume III Western Europe*, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), 633.

²⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, *Information Report: Strikes and Communist Tactics (France)*, April 20, 1951, <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>, 6.

²⁹ CIA, *Information Report: Strikes and Communist Tactics*, 3.

³⁰ Harry Truman, *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*. Edited by Robert H. Ferrell, (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 125.

³¹ William Tyler, "The Public Affairs Officer of the Embassy in France (Tyler) to the Secretary of State," February 3, 1950, in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950, Volume III Western Europe*, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), 1359.

³² David Bruce, "Telegram from the Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State," October 7, 1949, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/>, 669.

³³ CIA, *Information Report: Strikes and Communist Tactics*, 4.

³⁴ Aderath, 146.

³⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Intelligence Report No. 6140*, 10.

³⁶ U.S. Department of State, "United States Policy with Regard to French North Africa," March 22, 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948, Volume III Western Europe*, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), 683.

³⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Intelligence Report No. 5945: French Policies and Practices in Algeria*," June 1, 1952, <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>, 20.

³⁸ Aderath, 146.

³⁹ Fauvet, 204.

⁴⁰ As quoted in CIA, *Information Report: Strikes and Communist Tactics*, 4.

⁴¹ As referenced in U.S. Department of State, *Intelligence Report No. 6140*, 12.

⁴² Georges Lavau, as referenced in Knapp, 103.

⁴³ Knapp, 103.

⁴⁴ Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Abroad: Reknitting the Fabric of a Common Policy," *New York Times*, February 8, 1954. [www.lib.fsu.edu/Historical New York Times database](http://www.lib.fsu.edu/HistoricalNewYorkTimesdatabase).

⁴⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower, as quoted in Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 58.

⁴⁶ Dean Acheson, as quoted in Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks (February 21 – June 5, 1947)*, (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), 140.

⁴⁷ CIA, *Strikes and Communist Tactics*, 1.

⁴⁸ CIA, *Strikes and Communist Tactics*, 5.

CHAPTER 2: PSYWAR FRANCE

“Psychological Warfare: The planned use by a nation of propaganda and activities other than combat which communicate ideas and information intended to influence the opinions, attitudes, emotions, and behavior of foreign groups in ways that will support the achievement of national aims.”

- Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on the “Plan for National Psywar,” July 10, 1950

While the specter of communism loomed over Western Europe, U.S. officials worked hurriedly to make up ground lost to Soviet propaganda. In doing so, the Americans developed a comprehensive and multi-dimensional scheme to combat communism in Europe. American planning for a psychological campaign to counter the Soviet threat began to evolve as early as the mid-1940s with scattered attempts to formalize peacetime psychological operations. In 1950, American anti-communism found form under the overarching statement of U.S. Cold War policy, NSC-68. The creation of the Psychological Strategy Board in 1951 further united the anti-communist efforts of the various U.S. departments and agencies into a concerted psychological campaign.

To the Americans, France would be the linchpin in any American plan for Western defense against the Soviet menace. The Fourth Republic appeared to be particularly susceptible to communist designs and intrigue, and it thus became all the more imperative for U.S. officials to develop a plan that would counter communist influence in France. Mindful of the sensitivity of a plan that would entail unprecedented American meddling in the affairs of another sovereign nation traditionally allied with the United States, U.S. planners embarked upon a psychological campaign, or “psywar,” designed to appeal to the French people and to lure them from the temptation of communism. This “psywar” would not entail conventional warfare, but would instead be a battle between competing ideologies, a war the United States was desperate to win.

From Black Propaganda to Political Warfare: The Evolution of Peacetime Psychological Operations

In the waning years of the Second World War and the early postwar era, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and later the War Department, held responsibility for the conduct of “morale operations” or “black propaganda.” However, as war evolved into peace and the new Cold War-era dawned, concern mounted over communist inroads in Western Europe, and France in particular. In 1947, the heads of the military services submitted a report to the National Security Council (NSC) suggesting that the uncharted waters of peacetime psychological operations be run by the State Department, with advice and consultation from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and a military service representative. This proposal touched off a debate within the newly created NSC. Instead of adopting the military proposal, the NSC approved NSC directive 4-A, which directed the DCI, not the State Department, “to initiate and conduct...covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security.”¹ Furthermore, NSC 4-A underlined the necessity to supplement U.S. foreign information activities with covert psychological operations.

In 1948, the State Department, unhappy with the CIA’s performance under NSC 4-A, submitted a paper to the NSC titled “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” which proposed the establishment of a “Directorate of Political Warfare Operations” within the NSC Secretariat under a director responsible to the secretary of state. The bulk of this proposal was accepted by the NSC; however, the “Director of Political Warfare” was changed to the “Director of Special Studies” and placed directly under the NSC.²

In May 1948, the NSC published NSC-7, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism.” In it, the NSC expressed concern over the place that communism seemed to enjoy in democracies, which surely referred to Western Europe and to France and Italy in particular: “The democracies have been deterred in meeting this [Soviet] threat, in part because communism has been allowed to operate as a legitimate political activity under the protection of civil liberties.”³ The NSC recommended in NSC-7 that the United States adopt a policy of organizing a “world-wide counter-offensive” against communism, with a first

priority given to Western Europe.⁴ This new counter-offensive would include an aggressive ideological campaign.⁵

The next month, at the urging of George F. Kennan, Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (PPS), the NSC superceded NSC 4-A and approved NSC 10/2 which called for a creation of an "Office of Special Projects" within the CIA to oversee the conduct of covert operations. "Covert operations" was then understood to mean "all activities...against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups, but which are so planned and executed that any U.S. government responsibility for them is not evident..."⁶ NSC 10/2's list of covert operations included, among others, propaganda, economic warfare, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.⁷ Although the vociferous debate over a psychological program in Western Europe seemed to temporarily subside with NSC 10/2, it was far from over.

The Cold War Comes To France

American policy on France during the late 1940s centered on the belief that France was absolutely key to America's overall anti-communist objectives and the resultant desire to ensure that France became a productive member of the Atlantic community and contributed to the security of U.S. interests. France was thus expected to remain dedicated to Western democratic principles and to align its foreign policy with that of the United States. Consequently, U.S. officials pushed for those measures that they believed would stem the tide of communism in France. In particular, U.S. officials focused on the delivery of aid via the Marshall Plan in order to encourage good governance on the part of the French non-communist governments and to hasten French economic recovery.⁸ However, the Truman administration soon determined that economic aid alone would be inadequate to reduce the popularity of communism in France.

By November 1948, extensive discussions within the U.S. government on what to do about the popularity of communism in France were already in progress. Two well-placed CIA sources, code-named "H1" and "H2,"ⁱ indicated that the situation there was "most critical."⁹ Both further stressed that time was of the essence, and that "matters have taken a serious turn in France that no effort should be spared."¹⁰ The sources suggested that a coordinated effort should

ⁱ H-1 and H-2 were probably officials within the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). Possible candidates are: Paul G. Hoffman, the ECA Administrator, Averell Harriman, U.S. Special Representative in Europe, and David Bruce, the head of the ECA (from CIA Document 307).

be made to combat communism in France, to include support for anti-communist elements of French labor, building up the Marshall Plan and “combating the communist efforts to wreck it.”¹¹ In addition, H1 suggested the employment of a “moving picture” like *Joan of Arc* in order to “electrify” the French psyche. Finally, H2 warned that the U.S. military establishment should be interested in this “overall program,” because France was key to their conception of Western defense; “if France [were to] “fall out of line, the whole military defense program...will crumble.”¹²

NSC-68 and the Campaign of Truth

In early 1950, the United States completed a comprehensive study of Soviet capabilities. Although there had been a slow crescendo to the discussions calling for a U.S. psychological campaign to combat communism, President Truman was sufficiently alarmed in the aftermath of the study to take action.¹³ In April 1950, the National Security Council adopted and circulated the classified “NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” which called for a “comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and frustrate the Kremlin design.”¹⁴ NSC-68 further indicated that such a program would involve increases in military and economic assistance programs, development of overt psychological warfare as well as the intensification of covert operations in the fields of economic, political and psychological warfare.¹⁵

In a speech given to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1950, Truman warned that “the cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world today by the forces of imperialistic communism. This is a struggle, above all else for the minds of men.”¹⁶ That day, on the heels of NSC-68, Truman inaugurated the beginning of an American anti-communist psychological effort by calling for a “Campaign of Truth,” in which the United States would “pool” its efforts in “a sustained, integrated program to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery.”¹⁷ As its objectives, the Campaign of Truth aimed to present America fairly and to counter all of the Soviet-inspired misrepresentations of the United States. The program further sought to deter military and ideological Soviet expansionism and to “roll back Soviet influence, not by arms...but by all means short of force.”¹⁸ In 1950, the U.S. budget for psychological warfare was \$34 million. With the adoption of NSC-68 and launch of the Campaign of Truth, this budget would increase fourfold within two years.¹⁹

In launching the Campaign of Truth, the United States understood that it would take a “large array of weapons” to combat the Soviet peace effort, especially in light of its popularity in Western Europe. For the first time, U.S. officials acknowledged that there were different “dimensions” required to successfully combat the influence of communism. First was the “diplomatic,” in which the United States would work to cement their alliances and to show friendly countries that it was not interested in forcing them to adopt an American political system or way of life, but rather wished to help these countries choose their own course...which would certainly be freedom over tyranny. The “military” dimension centered on the rearmament of the Western powers against the Soviet threat. The “economic” dimension required that the United States provide economic assistance to those areas of war-torn Europe most susceptible to communist influence and to bolster Western European economies. Finally, a new fourth “psychological” dimension emerged in which the United States would mount a campaign to link the diplomatic, military and economic aspects under the umbrella of a psychological appeal to those populations most vulnerable to communist designs.²⁰

The Campaign of Truth called for the creation of a “country plan” for each targeted nation. The United States Information Service (USIS) would lead this effort to convince populations that the United States provided positive leadership for the free world and to expose the Soviet “Big Lie.” Moreover, the United States further encouraged the use of U.S. aid made available through various assistance programs and sought to highlight the work of American technicians assisting these countries. In a particularly innovative step in postwar psychological operations, the campaign sought to loosely link information and cultural services, the U.S. military mission, exchange programs, mass communications channels to include press, radio, film, and even rural coffee houses, and U.S. non-governmental entities like the Rockefeller Foundation together under one plan. Furthermore, the United States would target “attitude-forming groups” including labor unions and government leaders.²¹

In the wake of NSC-68 and Truman’s Campaign of Truth, and as U.S. officials ratcheted up their anti-communist efforts, many in the U.S. administration expressed concern over perceived French ambivalence in the Cold War. Although France had certainly been a target country in previous disjointed efforts to combat communism in Western Europe, there had as yet been no set plan to deal with the threat of communism in France. As Frank Costigliola argues, this “restiveness” on the part of France “pointed to a persistent problem: how could the United

States shape the policies of allies like France, nations that still enjoyed some autonomy and whose interests often conflicted with those of Washington?”²² The month following the announcement of NSC-68 and the “Campaign of Truth,” William R. Tyler, a State Department expert on France, was one of the first to call for American intervention in France in the form of a comprehensive psychological campaign.²³

The Psychological Strategy Board

On April 4, 1951, in an effort to enable “more effective planning, coordination and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations,” President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), which absorbed and reinvented the Campaign of Truth within the framework of a more centralized authority with decentralized execution of the operations themselves. The role of the PSB was to act as a “nerve center” for strategic psychological operations. The PSB was to ensure the concerted use of all governmental activities to influence the “opinions, emotions, and behavior of foreign groups” to the achievement of U.S. national policy and aims.²⁴ In doing so, the board would formulate overall policies, programs, objectives and plans for psychological operations. The PSB was designed to be an interagency board that would report to the National Security Council. Included as members of the PSB were the Undersecretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, as well representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and any other interested department or agency as determined by the PSB. Finally, the Board was directed to “utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the participating departments and agencies,”²⁵ which demonstrated the desire of the Truman administration for a fully integrated and coordinated anti-communist psychological campaign.

The PSB would oversee operations in what the U.S. government termed “white,” “gray,” and “black” areas; “white” areas being that which was “openly acknowledged as emanating from or distributed by” the United States, “gray” that which in a U.S. government connection “is not acknowledged but is concealed and attribution is made to some other source within or outside the U.S...or no attribution is made,” and “black” being that in which the “genuine source is not acknowledged but concealed and attribution is made to Soviet, Communist, or other hostile sources...”²⁶

The PSB and the Birth of the U.S. Psychological Campaign in France

Several months after President Truman created the PSB, representatives of the State Department, Defense Department, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and the CIA met with Director for Mutual Security Averell Harriman and PSB Director Gordon Gray to discuss the power of the communist parties in France and Italy in light of the recent electoral successes of both the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) and the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI). The representatives agreed that economic aid alone would be insufficient to counter the communist threat and believed that new “techniques” should be employed to deprive the French and Italian communists of their power and influence. Following the meeting, the State Department instructed its embassies in Paris and Rome to attempt to persuade the French and Italian governments to take a more aggressive role against the communists. Allen Dulles, then deputy director of the CIA, met with the ambassadors and members of the ECA to formulate specific actions for the French and American governments to undertake in carrying out anti-communist measures. Dulles outlined the conclusions reached in these meetings in a memorandum entitled “Analysis of the Power of the Communist Parties in France and Italy and of Measures to Counter Them,” and submitted them to the DCI and the PSB. In the report dated September 15, 1951, Dulles argued for a concerted psychological campaign in France and Italy as a matter of U.S. policy:

...it should be a major point of American and of NATO policy to cripple these communist parties, to uncover their true intentions, to sow discord in their ranks and promote defection, to deprive them of privilege and respectability, and to drive them underground...[and that] a stepped up program of action might well be considered by the Psychological Strategy Board in consultation with State, Defense, ECA and CIA, and then coordinated with our Embassies in Rome and Paris.²⁷

In light of the Dulles report, the PSB created a planning panel to discuss the psychological imperatives of the Soviet menace in France and Italy. “Panel C” specifically tackled communist strength and influence in those countries. The Panel’s “Plan A” for France outlined recommended actions to be taken both by the French government and the United States government. Plan A was a relatively novel endeavor for U.S. policymakers at the time, as treatment of the communist problem in France, in particular, involved “influencing” the internal affairs of another sovereign nation that was a long-standing ally of the United States.²⁸

For the French government, the Panel recommended “repressive” measures such as a reorganization of the French internal security system to better deal with the existence of a communist “fifth column” operating in France. It also called for continued pressure to eliminate communists from key positions within the French administrations and to outlaw French communist organizations and fronts. Finally, the report called for “discreet” government assistance to a “deviationist” movement within the French communist party. Moreover, the Panel recommended that the French government undertake “positive” measures that included supporting organizations that conduct anti-communist propaganda, creating a program to increase productivity, and shipping U.S. military aid cargoes through those friendly French ports where the dockworkers were unlikely participate in communist agitation. The Panel further called for additional measures proposed for “planning purposes.” These measures included pressuring the French to legislatively and administratively “harass” French communists by revising electoral laws favorable to communists and withholding government benefits from communist organizations.²⁹

For the United States government, the Panel recommended actions that centered on French public opinion, propaganda, public relations, and economic pressure. The Panel advocated “repressive” measures including discrediting French communist propaganda, “destroying” communist leadership in the trade unions, and reducing the power of the communist press. Other more “positive” actions included developing propaganda programs to expose the Stalinist myth and convince the French of the rightness of the American cause while providing support for “center” parties and the use of “economic pressure” through the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) Production Assistance Program, aid for non-communist labor unions, and funds for promoting efficient French defense production. The Panel further argued for an off-shore procurement program that would favor cooperative plants and labor unions against communist-dominated organizations and use of “friendly” French ports and facilities. The Panel further recommended that the U.S. government “encourage” efforts to defeat neutralism in France.ⁱⁱ Finally, for “planning purposes,” the Panel recommended among other items, supporting French legislation to weaken communists, support for non-communist citizens, organizations and press, and the creation of a European non-communist labor organization. It also advocated the

ⁱⁱ This line was in the October 26, 1951 draft of the Panel C recommendations, but was absent in the November 6, 1951 draft.

regulation of U.S. military installations and activities in order to avoid the potential of adverse propaganda that could become the basis for French resentment of the United States.³⁰

Following the submission of the Panel's recommendations on France, "Plan A" was criticized for lacking a cohesive element that united the objectives of the plan. Most of the suggested items in the report fell under two lines of approach. The first were those things that U.S. should do to lead its NATO allies to further economic and political association in order to share the defense burden and to "convince Europeans that they must maintain economic and social progress while rearming."³¹ The second line of approach included those things that the French must do, with U.S. support and aid, to bring about a "New Deal" in France. J.W. Jones of the ECA, a contributing member of the Panel report, summed up the work yet to be done: "...if the two main lines of approach are concentrated upon, sharpened, and real thought given to the 'something' that might be added to make them psychologically of fullest effectiveness, they might be the answer..."³²

PSB D-14c

The Psychological Strategy Board soon returned to the difficult question of what to do about France. It worked feverishly to create a definitive, finalized plan to reduce the power of communism. This plan was a difficult undertaking and proved hard to justify along stated U.S. traditions of non-interference in the affairs of another sovereign nation. However, U.S. officials on the PSB argued that the question was "not whether [the United States] can afford to fight communism in France, but whether it can afford not to."³³ These policymakers justified intervention in France as an act of self-defense against the Kremlin's designs.³⁴ On January 31, 1952 the NSC approved PSB D-14c "Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France," thus inaugurating what would become an unprecedented American intervention in the internal affairs of a longtime and trusted ally.

In the formulation of PSB D-14c, U.S. officials argued that the power of communism in France held strategic significance for the United States as an "instrument through which the Soviet Union is harassing French economic recovery, weakening the French and NATO defense effort, and encouraging neutralism, all with the object of making France an undependable ally of the West in times of peace or war."³⁵ U.S. policymakers contended that the PCF was a "serious" threat to "American foreign policy and to NATO plans for the defense of Western Europe."³⁶ The plan divided up "desired actions" into Group A, repressive actions designed to reduce the

PCF's sources of power, and Group B, actions by which the United States would provide positive encouragement and aid to the French in their anti-communist programs. The truly integrated and joint nature of this plan is evident as under each action were listed the U.S. departments or agencies holding responsibility for each particular item. The State Department, Defense Department and MSA were typically listed in these roles; however, there was one other agency which was also frequently listed as a responsible organization but whose name was redacted in all cases, no doubt a veiled reference to the CIA.³⁷

Group A included those actions to be taken by the French government and carried over many of the Panel's suggestions, including reorganization of the internal security system, removal of communists from sensitive government positions, revision of parliamentary and electoral laws favorable to the communists and mandating the use of anti-communist shipping and port facilities for the delivery of MSA goods. PSB D-14c also incorporated new actions into Group A actions for the French government in the trade union field such as the elimination of government subsidies to the CGT, curtailment of communist control and rights within plant committees, and support of the development of a free trade union movement. It further called for the government to persuade employers to stop dealing with communist unions and paying tributes to the PCF. Additionally, in the field of government, the French were to accelerate deportation of foreign communists, harass French affiliates of international communist organizations, restrict the availability of news materials to communist press organizations, and restrict sale of Soviet publications. In the field of national defense, the French government was to strengthen legislation on military security and sabotage and utilize the anti-communist potential inherent in the French military program and its support for NATO infrastructure programs.³⁸

Group A actions also included those to be undertaken by the United States government. It carried over a number of the original Plan A recommendations. These actions included U.S. support for both French and covert American attempts to destroy the communist hold in French trade unions, the creation of a free trade union movement, actions to discredit communist propaganda, and the regulation of U.S. military activities to deny adverse propaganda to the communists. PSB D-14c also injected new actions for the U.S. government. These actions included, among others, creating "difficulties" for fellow-traveling French navy men who took leave in U.S. ports and the discreet subsidization of the distribution of "care" packages to the poorest of the French population. In the political field, the U.S. government was to encourage a

deviationist movement within the PCF. With respect to public opinion, the United States government was to intensify efforts to work with non-communist groups to build French public support for “France’s military, economic and political position as a member of NATO and a unified Europe.”³⁹ The United States was also to discredit communist income sources including any French business firms that illegally traded with the Soviet bloc.⁴⁰

Group B actions included those positive actions by both the French and American governments to encourage continued anti-communist efforts in France. These included measures taken by the French government to implement industrial productivity programs and encourage unity on the part of non-communist labor unions. They also included developing programs for social improvement and a remedy for an inequitable national income distribution. The United States was to provide encouragement and assistance to the French government in all of its anti-communist endeavors. Moreover, it was to organize an information campaign to convince Frenchmen that U.S. policy for France centered not only on military defense but also improvement of the average Frenchman’s standard of living, and to convey that the United States desired to work together with all members of the Atlantic community to strengthen its common political, economic, and social bonds. The U.S. government was also to continue to encourage center parties in France. Regarding foreign aid programs, the United States was to provide economic aid to enable the French to keep its European defense and NATO commitments in addition to their military campaign in Indochina. Finally, the United States was to develop its own anti-communist and pro-democratic propaganda machine.⁴¹

U.S. Interventionism and the French Experiment

The United States’ plan to reduce the influence of communism also came to define U.S. policy toward France. The psychological program for France encompassed all aspects of French life. PSB D-14c provided the structure and oversight of the campaign, but it was manifested in every U.S. initiative, from the highly publicized Marshall Plan and educational exchange programs, to the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). Moreover, this campaign incorporated certain covert aspects which included (among others) CIA involvement in and funding of the CCF and trade union movements, and the U.S. government enlistment of Hollywood and interference in the internal political processes of metropolitan France. As a result, every individual U.S. policy initiative and program that affected France must be viewed within the context of the overall psychological campaign. Conversely, it is equally important to view the

American anti-communist psychological campaign in France within the context of overall U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War. To do so provides critical insight into why the United States was ultimately so concerned with France and why it would embark on a program that would forever change the nature of U.S.-French relations.

¹ National Security Council, "Document 253: Memorandum from the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the Members of the National Security Council, NSC 4-A," December 9, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/intro7.html, 1.

² U.S. Department of State, "Introduction," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/intro7.html.

³ National Security Council, *A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on the Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-directed World Communism*, March 30, 1948, <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>, 3.

⁴ NSC, *Position of U.S. on Soviet-directed Communism*, 6.

⁵ NSC, *Position of U.S. on Soviet-directed Communism*, 8.

⁶ National Security Council, "Document 288: Note by Executive Secretary (Souers) to the National Security Council, NSC 10/1," June 15, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/intro7.html, 3.

⁷ National Security Council, "Document 288," 3.

⁸ U.S. Department of State, "Policy Statement of the Department of State: France," September 20, 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 Vol. III Western Europe*, (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1974), 651-652.

⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 307: Memorandum for the File," November 16, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/intro7.html, 1.

¹⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 307," 1.

¹¹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 307," 1.

¹² Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 307," 1.

¹³ Edward Barrett, *Truth is Our Weapon*, (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1953), 72-73.

¹⁴ National Security Council, *NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, April 14, 1950, <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>, 56.

¹⁵ National Security Council, *NSC-68*, 56.

¹⁶ Harry S. Truman, "Address on Foreign Policy at a Luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors," April 29, 1950, in *Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman 1945-1953*, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers, 2>.

¹⁷ Harry S. Truman, "Address on Foreign Policy," 4.

¹⁸ Barrett, 78-79.

¹⁹ Trevor Barnes, "The Secret Cold War: The CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe 1946-1956, Part II," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 25 No.3 (1982): 649-670. www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/search/.

²⁰ Barrett, 228.

²¹ Barrett, 315-317.

²² Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance*, 84.

²³ Costigliola, 85.

²⁴ Psychological Strategy Board, "Paper Approved by Psychological Strategy Board," September 28, 1951, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951 Volume 1: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*, (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1979), 178-179.

²⁵ Harry S. Truman, "Directive by the President to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Marshall), and the Director of Central Intelligence (Smith)," April 4, 1951, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume I National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1979), 59.

²⁶ United States Information and Educational Exchange Program (USIE), "Foreign Service Information and Education Exchange Circular, No. 4," November 1, 1951, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume I National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1979), 954.

²⁷ Psychological Strategy Board, *Third Report to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board with Regard to Implementation of PSB D-14c*, January 26, 1952, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS?locID=tall28252, 2-3>.

²⁸ Psychological Strategy Board, *Third Report*, 3.

²⁹ Psychological Strategy Board, *Panel C: Plan A*, November 6, 1951, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS?locID=tall28252, 3-6>.

³⁰ Psychological Strategy Board, *Panel C*, 7-10.

³¹ White House, *Paper Entitled Status Report on the Work of the Panel C of the Psychological Strategy Board*, November 27, 1951, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS?locID=tall28252, 2>.

³² White House, *Paper Entitled Status Report*, 2.

³³ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c and the Evolution of the Cold War*, July 16, 1953, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS?locID=tall28252,3>.

³⁴ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB-D-14c and the Evolution of the Cold War*, 3.

³⁵ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c Psychological Operations Plan*, 5.

³⁶ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c Psychological Operations Plan*, 5.

³⁷ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c Psychological Operations Plan*, 12-23.

³⁸ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c Psychological Operations Plan*, 12-15.

³⁹ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c Psychological Operations Plan*, 17.

⁴⁰ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c Psychological Operations Plan*, 16-18.

⁴¹ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c Psychological Operations Plan*, 19-23.

CHAPTER 3: AMERICA’S ANTI-COMMUNIST AGENDA: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE

“...few bolder and more novel initiatives were taken bearing on the relations of one sovereign government with another sovereign government.”

- “PSB D-14c and the Evolution of the Cold War,” July 16, 1953

With the approval of PSB D-14c in February 1952, the United States formally embarked upon a comprehensive anti-communist psychological campaign in France that would, in time, permeate every aspect of French affairs. PSB D-14c not only consolidated previous anti-communist efforts and provided the framework for the American intervention in France, it also became a statement of U.S. foreign policy and reflected a larger, “dynamic U.S. policy designed to defeat Soviet communism and to win the Cold War peacefully.”¹ France was a large and important country in continental Europe and the success of American initiatives there depended on a reliable French ally. Consequently, France was not “marginal” to American decision making and was a central feature in American efforts to roll back communism in Western Europe.²ⁱ

American officials understandably attributed French recalcitrance on some U.S. policies to the power and influence of a French communist party which, with few exceptions, opposed almost every U.S. initiative in the early Cold War era. Determined to turn France into a more receptive ally, U.S. officials attempted to mold the economic, cultural, military, governmental, and labor mechanisms of French society. In doing so, PSB D-14c and the iterations that followed became an underlying determinant of every U.S. policy affecting France during this period. Conversely, U.S. Cold War policy concerns largely dictated both the necessity of anti-communist psychological operations and the nature and extent of the American intervention in Fourth Republic France. As a result, this American anti-communist campaign would become an overarching factor that would shape U.S.-French relations in the early Cold War era and beyond.

ⁱ See Irwin Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*. Wall argues that although France was a “central battleground” in the Cold War, it was “marginal” to the decision making in Washington. (p.5)

In the Field Of Economics: the European Recovery Program

On November 17, 1947, in a Special Session of Congress, President Harry Truman announced the inauguration of a European Recovery Program (ERP) designed to help the war-torn nations of Western Europe rebuild financially and once again become self-supporting democracies.³ Although it was certainly in the interest of the United States' own economy that Europe recover from the war as quickly as possible, the Marshall Plan (as the ERP came to be known) complemented the underlying American Cold War interest in keeping Soviet ideological and military expansionism at bay. In explaining the interests of the United States in European recovery, Truman outlined U.S. policy concerns:

The economic plight in which Europe now finds itself has intensified a political struggle between those who wish to remain free men living under the rule of law and those who would use economic distress as a pretext for the establishment of a totalitarian state.⁴

Under the Marshall Plan, the United States pledged up to \$20 billion in relief aid to Western Europe, with the understanding that the participating nations would come together to devise a plan to use the American aid efficiently and effectively.⁵ The Truman administration hoped that the influx of economic aid under the ERP would increase the standard of living in Western Europe and thus bolster the standings of moderate parties and weaken the appeal of communism there.⁶ More importantly, U.S. officials hoped that the Marshall Plan would prevent the collapse of France and the failure of American "plans" for Europe.⁷ In return, nations such as France, which received U.S. assistance, were expected to regularly provide information on every aspect of their indigenous communist parties.⁸

The Truman administration believed that the most "imminent danger" of economic collapse and totalitarian advancement existed in France and Italy, for which they requested from Congress emergency interim aid while the ERP was still in development. For France, Truman requested \$328 million, a larger aid package than that for any other nation.⁹ American ERP officials believed that France was "one of the principal battlefields in the international communist campaign to prevent European recovery" with the communists "clearly acting in the belief that a France further weakened economically will fall prey first to social disorder and chaos, then to revolution." They argued that a "communist-controlled France would make the maintenance of democracy elsewhere in Western Europe almost insuperably difficult."¹⁰ The success of the PCF in France would also mean that the Soviets could control French resources

that would strengthen the military and economic capacity of the Soviet Union while harming American economic and security interests in the region.¹¹

The introduction of the economic aid under the European Recovery Program, and the French component of, and participation in, the Marshall Plan were thus critical to an American anti-communist agenda. The ERP provided the economic aid called for under the PSB-D-14c psychological operations plan for France by funding industrial productivity programs, non-communist labor unions, as well as programs for social improvement and equitable national income distribution.¹² The ERP engendered the United States' desire to "Americanize" the French psyche by advocating the adoption of American economic practices, which were deemed superior to French methods. In an effort to support its drive for European rearmament without sacrificing the standard of living (which would surely have emboldened PCF protests against the Marshall Plan), the United States in 1950 expanded Marshall Plan programs in France to include a Productivity Program, which included displays of American industrial prowess and affluence such as exhibitions of American products and visits by American consultants.¹³ The United States also sponsored productivity missions to the United States in which European technicians and workers toured, among other things, American factories, farms, research centers, and business schools and met with U.S. labor leaders and government officials.¹⁴

The French were additionally treated to displays of American management, marketing, and human relations techniques and methods.¹⁵ Over one quarter of these Europeans who traveled to the United States under the auspices of the Marshall Plan were French.¹⁶ The United States embarked on this productivity drive with the hope that it would lead to a "new French revolution" within France's industrial base, a revolution in which "there would be no place for communism and class struggle."¹⁷

American officials also looked for a way to counter communist propaganda against the ERP itself, and proposed a number of measures to publicize the ERP. Suggestions included attaching slips to the paychecks of workers funded through the ERP indicating that their earnings had been furnished by American aid. The ECA also pressured the French to use ERP funds for social projects that would lessen the appeal of communism, such as the rebuilding of homes and hospitals. Other ideas included having popular French singer Edith Piaf dedicate songs to workers whose wages were funded by the ERP and creating a Marshall Plan cycling team to compete in the *Tour de France*.¹⁸

The ERP fit into larger U.S. strategic interests in forging Franco-German cooperation and creating an integrated Europe that could repel Soviet expansionism. Furthermore, the Marshall Plan incorporated West Germany into American integrationist plans, and attempted to tie American aid to French acceptance of U.S. plans for Germany. The Americans believed that the ERP would help create an integrated economic order along American federalist lines that would create a “balance of power in the West sufficient to contain Soviet power in the East.”¹⁹ By 1951, France had received almost \$2.3 billion in economic aid, the largest amount of any continental European country.²⁰ Later, as the Marshall Plan wound down and France regained prewar levels of production, American economic aid to France and to Western Europe continued, largely under military aid programs.²¹ These aid programs fell under the Marshall Plan’s successor organization, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) and the focus of American financial assistance soon shifted, much to the chagrin of the French government, to defense-related production.²²

In the Field of Public Opinion

The Congress for Cultural Freedom

Although U.S. officials viewed economic assistance as absolutely critical to the recovery of France and Western Europe, they soon determined that it was not enough to win the public relations war with the Soviet Union.ⁱⁱ George Kennan, Director of the PPS, argued that American programs for economic rehabilitation should be coupled with “concerted action to destroy the ideological myths spawned by communist propaganda,” in order to “break down Soviet influence outside its immediate orbit.”²³ Determined to counter Soviet misinformation and to portray America in a favorable light, the U.S. government quietly sponsored the international Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) founded in 1950 on an anti-communist manifesto.²⁴ The CCF’s manifesto was also clearly anti-neutralist, declaring that any “indifference or neutrality in the face of such a challenge amounts to a betrayal of mankind and to the abdication of the free mind. Our answers to this challenge may decide the fate of man for generations.”²⁵ The anti-communist and anti-neutralist agenda of the CCF melded perfectly with American foreign policy. At the helm of the CCF was CIA agent Michael Josselson, who, with a staff of dedicated anti-communists, worked throughout the 1950s and 1960s to “nudge the intelligentsia of Western

ⁱⁱ Alan Milward, in *The Reconstruction of Western Europe*, argues that the ERP did not “save” Europe and that the Europeans (including the French) were largely responsible for the success of Western Europe’s reconstruction. Milward’s argument and the French reaction to the Marshall Plan will be dealt with more specifically in Chapter 4.

Europe away from a lingering fascination with Marxism and Communism towards a view more accommodating of the American way.”²⁶

Shortly after its inception, the CCF came under the influence of the also newly created Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) that shouldered a broad responsibility for psychological operations to counter communist influence in select Western European nations. In May 1952, the PSB took over the supervision of the CIA’s psychological warfare program and its campaign to exert influence on the European intellectual class that was instrumental in forming overseas opinion. In doing so, the PSB became responsible for many of the indigenous American or American-sponsored programs that were an integral part of the CCF including Radio Free Europe and the U.S. contingent of the CCF, the American Committee for Cultural Freedom.²⁷

The PSB and the CIA exerted influence over the CCF throughout the early Cold War era, not only through Josselson, but also through other highly placed CIA men such as Melvin Lasky, who was the editor of the CCF publication *Der Monat* and acted as a conduit for CIA money and advice, and Thomas Braden, head of the CIA’s International Organizations Division, who channeled money to the CCF through CIA-front foundations, such as the Fairfield Foundation of New York, in order to disguise the extent of U.S. interest in the CCF agenda.²⁸ This unique position within the CCF meant that the CIA could infuse American foreign policy objectives into CCF operations. In return, “they [the CIA] listened attentively to a group whose unique access to the intellectual currents of Western Europe could ease or even modify the methods and arguments used to formulate these objectives.”²⁹ Finally, as a supplement to covert CIA funding, the ECA provided Marshall Plan funding for demonstrations against Soviet-sponsored events.³⁰

Although the CCF sponsored cultural events throughout Western Europe, France was considered to be one of the CCF’s target countries, deemed so because of the strength of communist influence and undoubtedly because of U.S. interest in a French ally more receptive to U.S. policy initiatives.³¹ According to CCF delegate Arthur Koestler, Paris was the “world capital of fellow-travelers” and sympathetic French intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Pablo Picasso were suffering from the “French flu.”³² In France, the CCF, with CIA funding, launched the international review *Preuves* in March 1951 in an attempt to inject liberal anti-communist views into French intellectual debates.³³ In April 1952, the CCF-sponsored “Oeuvres du Vingtieme Siècle” in Paris presented hundreds of ballets, operas, and symphonies to “destroy the European myth of American cultural inferiority.”³⁴

The French national committee of the CCF in Paris, “Les Amis de la Liberté,” was the first of the CCF national steering committees to be created. Les Amis de la Liberté collected signatures in support of the CCF’s anti-communist manifesto, organized demonstrations against Soviet-sponsored clubs in France, and disseminated anti-communist propaganda. In addition, the Paris committee created “Maisons de la Liberté” that housed libraries and meeting rooms in many of France’s large cities, forged alliances with women’s and youth groups, and sponsored liberal, anti-communist seminars.³⁵ The CCF also founded other anti-communist clubs in Paris, including the student group “Maisons Jeunes des Amis de la Liberté.”³⁶

In order to channel money to CCF projects, the CIA created a large number of private dummy foundations. Many legitimate foundations also provided funding for CCF endeavors; interestingly enough, many of these same organizations had CIA men or U.S. government officials as trustees. McGeorge Bundy and his brother William, both of whom had CIA connections, served on the board of the Ford Foundation, which provided funding for international program of the Institute of Contemporary Arts.³⁷ The Rockefeller Foundation, which had links to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, gave money to Thomas Braden for many of the CCF’s French projects, including an exhibition in Paris by the Museum of Modern Art.³⁸ The exhibit was a part of a “free art” ideology as espoused by U.S. officials like George Kennan, who had served as the Director of the State Department’s Policy and Planning Staff (PPS) and U.S. Ambassador to Moscow. This ideology had the purpose of highlighting U.S. contributions to art such as the uniquely American school of abstract expressionism with the hope of correcting negative French cultural impressions of the United States, which Kennan and others thought affected the U.S. international position.³⁹ Finally, the CIA created the dummy organization “American Committee for a United Europe” to fund a European Movement for an integrated Western Europe. In France, these CIA funds were channeled to the “Centre Européen de la Culture,” in order to garner French support for a unified Europe along American designs.⁴⁰

Education Programs and Exchanges

In addition to the programs of the CCF, the cultural aspect of the U.S. anti-communist campaign included education programs and exchanges. The passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948 had paved the way for the full use of U.S. educational, information, and propaganda resources in its ideological battle with the Soviet Union.⁴¹ Even Senator William Fulbright, who initially opposed the enlistment of such programs in the Cold War, conceded that the program

was designed to “influence political matters through the intelligent leadership of the important countries.”⁴² After 1951, the United States inaugurated a drive to include American studies in the curriculum of European schools. Although the French responded somewhat unenthusiastically to this idea, American pressure did lead the French to establish chairs in American history and literature at universities in Paris, Lyon, Lille, and Bordeaux.⁴³ The United States, through the Department of State and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, also funded new textbooks, courses, and seminars on the United States.⁴⁴ The Operations Coordinating Board, the follow-on to the PSB and responsible for the execution of PSB D-14c and PSB D-38, the “National Psychological Strategy Plan for Western Europe,” recommended using the Fulbright Program and other educational exchanges for the express purpose of garnering French support for specific U.S. foreign policy interests, including the integrationist European Movement, which the United States viewed as a bulwark against Soviet communism, and an umbrella under which it could further its own interests in the European Defense Community (EDC), NATO, and a unified Western Europe that included a rehabilitated West Germany.⁴⁵

The Enlistment of Hollywood

The United States also sought to counter communist propaganda, as directed by PSB D-14c, by enlisting the help of the American film industry. American planners understood that Hollywood films could be yet another weapon in the U.S. anti-communist psychological campaign by promoting democratic ideals and weakening the appeal of communism in Western Europe. By the early 1950s, the PSB was receiving reports from an undercover CIA agent at Paramount Pictures in Hollywood, Carleton Alsop, who reported to the PSB and CIA on the successes and failures of covert methods to introduce specific themes into Hollywood films.⁴⁶

In response to poor showings at the Cannes film festivals of the early postwar era, the United States resolved to focus more attention on the American film industry in an attempt to reach French audiences.⁴⁷ The U.S. government used the Motion Picture Export Association to help American films overcome protectionist barriers to reenter the market in Western Europe. In return, film studios were expected to export films that cast the United States in a favorable light. Although the French public (and French intelligentsia, in particular) was reluctant to accept American films,ⁱⁱⁱ France desperately needed the American aid that was contingent upon the

ⁱⁱⁱ Trade agreements such as the Blum-Byrnes Accords that incorporated increased quotas for American films shown in France led to violent protests in 1948. (Saunders, 288).

acceptance of an open market. Consequently, the French government eliminated prewar import restrictions and paved the way for an American film invasion.⁴⁸

In December 1955, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff met with industry officials to discuss how a new idea, termed “Militant Liberty” could be exploited by Hollywood.⁴⁹ “Militant Liberty” was an anti-communist ideology of “individual freedom supported by self-disciplined peoples, politically and enthusiastically dedicated to freedom and the implementation of freedom on a world-wide basis.”⁵⁰ Six months later, representatives of the Joint Chiefs met with prominent anti-communist Hollywood stars such as Ward Bond and John Wayne to discuss anti-communism in film. The CIA also enjoyed links with Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney of CV Whitney Pictures who allowed the Whitney Trust to be used to channel CIA funds into Hollywood. Whitney himself was a contributor to U.S. psychological warfare planning efforts.⁵¹ Finally, the Motion Picture Service (MPS) circulated approved Hollywood films through a vast network of U.S. Information Service posts throughout France and Western Europe. Moreover, the MPS, with consultant Cecil B. DeMille, regularly advised the Operations Coordinating Board on film selection for the international market. Thus, in the 1950s a wide array of anti-communist films were shown in France and Western Europe, including among others, *The Red Menace*, *The Red Nightmare*, and *I Was a Communist for the FBI*.⁵²

U.S. Information Programs and the USIA

Also falling under the PSB objective of countering communist propaganda was the myriad of U.S. information programs whose principal aim was “to increase support abroad for those policies and programs which we consider necessary to pursue in the national interest and to persuade foreign governments and peoples that such U.S. policies and programs are also in their interest.”⁵³ The most prominent of these was the U.S. Information Service, renamed in August 1953 by President Dwight Eisenhower as the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). Although the USIA was not publicly advertised as a U.S. weapon of psychological warfare, U.S. officials believed it was a key instrument of national policy within the context of the Cold War as a form of political warfare.⁵⁴ The USIA was specifically geared to a communist adversary including both Soviet communists and the world communist movement, comprising the communist parties of other nations as well as the Soviet-inspired international front organizations that freely operated in many nations.⁵⁵ In 1955, the USIA director became a full-member of the OCB, the follow-on organization to the PSB.⁵⁶

The USIA in France administered embassy libraries, cultural centers, and America Houses. It supervised book translations, exhibits and English-language courses.⁵⁷ The USIA also sponsored and oversaw programs similar to those under the CCF. In 1955, the USIA sponsored a “Salute to France” in Paris that presented American musical, ballet, and theatrical events. As well as attempting to project the United States in a favorable light, the USIA undertook active information campaigns designed to persuade Western Europeans, and specifically the French, to support U.S. policies. In particular, the USIA worked to increase the popularity of the NATO concept and West Germany’s role within the community of Atlantic nations by providing radio and newsreel coverage of NATO Council Meetings.⁵⁸ The USIA also assigned a public affairs advisor in Paris to organize coordination of all U.S. information support to governmental and non-governmental organizations dedicated to the cause of European unity.⁵⁹

In the Field of Trade Unions

The communist-dominated Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) was the most powerful trade union in France, and it accordingly enjoyed enormous leverage in the French political scene and on the minds of the French working class. Determined to break communist control over the CGT, the United States, through the CIA, engaged in covert operations to reshape the landscape of French trade unions in order to reorient French labor more favorably toward the United States. As early as March 1947, Douglas MacArthur II, the first political secretary of the Paris embassy, wrote of the need to “build up a ‘broad and well-knit coalition of forces’ that would include significant trade union elements...” Consequently, it was necessary to “split, or at least neutralize, the CGT and gain the support of substantial socialist elements in order to give the anti-communist coalition substantial roots in the working class.”⁶⁰ By the end of the year, American labor leaders and the CIA were pressuring the Force Ouvrière (FO), a more moderate confederation of trade unions, to break off from the communist-controlled CGT. Once the split occurred, U.S. Ambassador to France Jefferson Caffery called the break “the most important event that has occurred in France since the Liberation...”⁶¹

In late 1947, Caffery asked that the United States consider covert assistance for union groups opposed to the CGT such as the FO.⁶² Accordingly, the CIA began a secret program to fund non-communist French unions including the FO and the Catholic Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC).⁶³ Moreover, CIA officials created front organizations intended to rival Soviet-sponsored organizations. To combat communism in the French trade

unions, the CIA recruited and employed the expertise of the undisputed experts in the labor field, the AFL-CIO.⁶⁴ American labor leaders Jay Lovestone, then in charge of the international division of the AFL, and Irving Brown, an AFL labor representative to Europe, led these efforts. The CIA also had knowledge of and provided assistance to other American union leaders, such as David Dubinsky of the Garment Union, who financed the FO's initial break with the CGT.⁶⁵ Irving Brown, in particular, became adept at channeling U.S. taxpayer money and Marshall Plan funds to the French non-communist unions.⁶⁶ Brown also dabbled in the darker side of the labor issue by secretly financing a "Mediterranean Committee" of thugs from Marseille to stand watch at French ports that handled U.S. Marshall Plan supplies and the delivery of arms for NATO defense.⁶⁷

U.S. officials pressured the French to offer concessions such as wage and cost of living increases to non-communist labor unions or suffer the consequences of a strengthened communist position within the French labor movement.⁶⁸ The United States also criticized the French government's handling of the labor situation and its inability to couch labor issues as the government working together with the workers against the communists. The United States further called for the creation of a new "free labor" movement, "adapted to French conditions but borrowing the best features of U.S. trade unionism..."⁶⁹ and devoid of overemphasis on political affiliation.

Finally, the Eisenhower administration quietly put leaders of U.S. labor unions who were financing anti-communist activity in Western Europe in touch with other private citizens who ran charitable foundations and frequently channeled money into anti-communist programs in Europe. In August 1954, Eisenhower himself suggested to Thomas McCabe, President of Scott Paper Company and a member of the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, that he contact David Beck, President of the Teamster's Union, to discuss the need to develop young labor leaders and increase cooperation between labor in the United States and Western Europe.⁷⁰ The administration also encouraged private American labor representatives to invite "promising" individuals in the CGT to the United States and show them how advanced U.S. labor had become through the use of collective bargaining and cooperation with management, and how these practices could be applied in France.⁷¹

In the Field of Government and Politics

The United States, under the general framework of PSB D-14c, pressured the French governments of the Fourth Republic to initiate legal and administrative measures, not only to diminish the protection that the communists enjoyed under the French Constitution, but also to ensure the continuation of moderate governments that the United States believed would be more receptive to U.S. leadership in foreign affairs.⁷² Much of the reform program and its U.S. funding would fall under the umbrella of the European Recovery Program, which disbursed its funds on the condition that its recipients would use it to undertake reforms consistent with American objectives and based on an American model. For France, central to the American conception of the Marshall Plan was the desire that it increase the standard of living in France and thus increase support for the centrist politicians who could take credit for securing U.S. aid. The United States feared both a communist takeover on one extreme and the authoritarian, unreliable nature of a return of Charles de Gaulle on the other.^{iv} For that reason, the United States actively supported moderate parties in France, secretly financing their campaigns through CIA funds.⁷³ It is certainly likely that the CIA played a role beyond that of channeling funds to center parties in France. According to Thomas Braden, then head of the CIA's International Organizations Division, the CIA also bribed at least one member of the French cabinet during this period.⁷⁴

The United States also took advantage of its position as a benefactor of the French to suggest proposals to combat communism. American embassy officials in Paris were encouraged to take every opportunity to remind the French just how important the United States viewed anti-communist programs in France. However, the U.S. government also warned its embassy officials of the necessity to feed the perception that actions in the governmental field resulted from French initiative.⁷⁵ Although it proved difficult for the United States to scientifically evaluate whether some of the anti-communist actions and reforms that the French government undertook resulted from U.S. pressure or homegrown anti-communist zeal, U.S. officials concluded that PSB D-14c was affecting French anti-communist efforts.⁷⁶ In its follow-up Progress Reports on PSB D-14c, the PSB and later the OCB, reported that "in accordance with the terms of PSB D-14c" there had been a concerted effort on the part of the U.S. government to reduce communist strength in France and that the government of France had "taken a series of

^{iv} Although the United States wished to avoid a Gaullist government, even de Gaulle was preferable to a communist government linked to the Soviet Union.

anti-communist actions with varying degrees of effectiveness.”⁷⁷ The PCF, according to a White House report, also attributed more aggressive French anti-communist actions to increased American pressure.⁷⁸

In particular, Fourth Republic governments took steps to discreetly remove communists from sensitive government positions, especially within the Atomic Energy Commissariat, the police and military services, and local communist mayor’s offices. In response to U.S. pressure to reorganize the internal security system, the French augmented its gendarmerie divisions by creating new units and assigning auxiliary personnel in the event of an emergency mobilization. Although the French were reluctant to amend the laws on parliamentary immunity that benefited communist deputies, the government did pass a law requiring the appointment of a legally-responsible co-director for all newspapers which had directors covered by parliamentary immunity. In a related move, the French began to enforce defamation laws, which resulted in the prosecution of communist editors for libelous comments against the French government or the United States. The government also expelled hundreds of “foreign communists” from France and initiated “harassing actions” against communist front organizations and arrested several of their leaders. In addition, the French revised electoral laws to reduce PCF representation in the parliament and initiated legal proceedings against the PCF for threatening both the internal and external security of the French state. Finally, the French took measures to handicap the communist press, including a prohibition on the sale of Soviet periodicals and the distribution of Cominform publications.⁷⁹

In the Field of National Defense

When PSB D-14c was originally approved in January of 1952, the plan included specific actions in the field of national defense such as the use of non-communist port and shipping facilities for Mutual Security Agency (MSA) goods and the improvement of legislation on military security. However, the plan also alluded to what would become a major foreign policy imperative for the United States--that is, European military integration in the face of a Soviet threat. American officials viewed the European Defense Community (EDC) to be key to the NATO concept for Western defense against Soviet encroachment, and recommended \$500 million in economic aid for France for the second half of 1952 and for the first half of 1953.⁸⁰ Although the French government agreed with the U.S. administration on the threat posed by the Soviet Union, the French and the Americans were still divided on how to go about creating the

defensive bulwark against the Soviets that both U.S. and French planners had, at one time, envisaged. As Chapter 4 shows, the main stumbling block remained the question of how to go about rearming and reintegrating Germany into Western Europe.⁸¹

Frustrated by perceived French recalcitrance on the EDC,^v the United States even threatened to create a new defensive framework focused on the European periphery of the U.K, Spain, Greece, Turkey and other nations. In a conversation with French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told him that France's "indecision and inability to make difficult decisions had in the past created a real problem with respect to France's relations not only with the U.S. but other allied countries."⁸² Dulles further warned that "if France now again procrastinates, the damage would be incalculable" and that "as long as the decision on the EDC is postponed, it is a direct invitation to the Soviets to increase their action to drive a wedge not only between France and Germany but also between the NATO powers."⁸³

By early 1954, the psychological operations framework provided by PSB D-14c and PSB D-38 expanded to include concerted campaigns in support of an integrated European military community. In follow-on PSB D-14c progress reports, the OCB called for information exchange among the members of NATO regarding successful anti-communist programs and policies, as well as the exploration of common measures taken by NATO members to reduce the influence of their indigenous communist parties. Furthermore, the OCB listed inducing the ratification by the French parliament of the EDC Treaty as a new objective in its anti-communist campaign.

In March 1954, the State Department cabled the U.S. embassy in Paris and directed the Ambassador and his staff to concentrate every effort on influencing and assisting the French in ratifying the EDC. The State Department further recommended that the Embassy employ, with CIA and USIA assistance, psychological expert C.D. Jackson's proposal to "utilize [Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav] Molotov's statements made at Berlin to demonstrate the real Soviet aims for Europe," which, according to U.S. officials present at the 1954 Berlin Conference, included dividing the Western powers, promoting the exclusion of U.S. political and military influence from Europe, and increasing Soviet influence and creating opportunities for Soviet expansionism into Western Europe.⁸⁴ The OCB further recommended the covert

^v The next chapter will discuss the French position on the EDC and Germany in more detail. However, it is sufficient here to suggest that although the French government supported the concept of an EDC, they had concerns over its organization and the implementation timeline as proposed by the Americans. These concerns were viewed as obstructionist by many American officials, and lent to the perception that the French must be pressured to conform to the U.S. EDC concept.

exploitation of the French fear of a U.S. military withdrawal from Europe.⁸⁵ Finally, the department, in conjunction with the OCB, requested the views of the Embassy on what propaganda themes and tactics would be most useful in the weeks leading up to the French vote on the EDC.

OCB representatives also determined that the United States should attempt to have its other European allies put pressure on the French to ratify the EDC. The OCB suggested that the State Department contact other EDC countries and outline “the desirability of having the Ambassador call the appropriate people together in the Embassy and emphasize to them the usefulness of generating pressures in their respective countries which could be brought to bear on the French...”⁸⁶ By June 1954, U.S. officials were sufficiently concerned about French EDC ratification to threaten loss of U.S. military aid if the EDC was not ratified. In a particularly ominous note for U.S. – French relations, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that “We have made it clear to our European allies that failure to approve and implement the EDC would necessitate a thorough reexamination of American policies.”⁸⁷

With respect to NATO, although the French had been willing signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, U.S. officials thought that “there [had] been a French tendency throughout the period of NATO’s development to delay vital governmental decisions regarding defense buildup, and to find excuses for a variety of shortfalls in the French defense effort.”⁸⁸ American officials attributed this tendency largely to French governmental weakness and overextension in colonial matters. The United States sought to provide the French with further financial aid to induce their continued support for the European concerns of NATO in spite of French commitments in Indochina. The United States had been particularly alarmed by a French government paper on NATO strategy that suggested that unless a Soviet attack was imminent on Western Europe, it was acceptable for the French ease up on the NATO defense effort there.⁸⁹ Even after the French defeat in Indochina in 1954, French forces were built up in response to rebellions in its North African colonies, which had the effect of reducing French NATO commitments to continental Europe. U.S. officials were thus directed to urge France to return NATO-committed forces to Europe which had been diverted to defend France’s colonial interests.⁹⁰ In addition, the French had been hesitant to unconditionally subscribe to a NATO concept that included West Germany. American officials were instructed to “convince” France of the necessity of following the American-dictated concept of NATO by slowing down U.S. aid

and making the French aware of a joint US-UK review of alternative strategic groupings in Western Europe that might exclude France.⁹¹

The French Backlash

Throughout the Fourth Republic, the United States sought to intervene in the affairs of France in order to mold it into a more “reliable” ally. It did so through a concerted psychological campaign infused with American foreign policy objectives and directed at every aspect of U.S. military, economic, and cultural relations with France, and the very political and social dynamics internal and unique to French society. The French, for their part, reacted both with appreciation, as many had welcomed at least some U.S. involvement in France, but also with alarm over the extent of the American invasion. Consequently, they desperately sought to maintain control over their own foreign policy, governmental practices, and the French way of life. In doing so, the French refused to become subservient U.S. proxies in the Cold War or to offer blanket acceptance of U.S. initiatives, and made their own way along a path between the two Cold War superpowers. The French could not have known all of the details or aspects of the secret American anti-communist campaign for France; yet it seems unlikely that they had no idea that they were the target of a U.S. effort to “roll back” communism. Their conscious and unconscious response to the U.S. effort, as outlined in the next chapter, largely determined the success of the American psychological campaign and had a direct bearing on the nature of U.S.-French relations throughout the Fourth Republic.

¹ Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin*, 28.

² Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France*, 5.

³ Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on the First Day of the Special Session, November 17, 1947,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1963), 494.

⁴ Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on the Marshall Plan, December 19, 1947,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1963), 517.

⁵ U.S. Department of State, “The Marshall Plan Website,” <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/57.htm>.

⁶ Esposito, *America’s Feeble Weapon*, xxii.

-
- ⁷ Esposito, 34.
- ⁸ Pells, *Not Like Us*, 53.
- ⁹ Truman, "Special Message November 17, 1947," 493.
- ¹⁰ U.S. Department of State. *European Recovery Program, Country Studies: Chapter V France 1948*, no date, 32.
- ¹¹ Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, 45.
- ¹² Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c and the Evolution of the Cold War*, 20-21.
- ¹³ Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 72.
- ¹⁴ Kuisel, 80.
- ¹⁵ Kuisel, 88-91.
- ¹⁶ Pells, 54.
- ¹⁷ Kuisel, 95.
- ¹⁸ Esposito, 97-99.
- ¹⁹ Hogan, 27.
- ²⁰ Roy Gardner, "The Marshall Plan Fifty Years Later: Three What-Ifs and a When," in Martin Shain, ed., *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 120.
- ²¹ Hogan, 444.
- ²² Kuisel, 73.
- ²³ Mitrovich, 30.
- ²⁴ Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 9.
- ²⁵ "Manifesto of Congress for Cultural Freedom (Berlin, 1950)," as reproduced in Coleman, 249-251.
- ²⁶ Saunders, 1.
- ²⁷ Saunders, 150-151.
- ²⁸ Pells, 72-73.
- ²⁹ Saunders, 108.
- ³⁰ Saunders, 39.
- ³¹ Pells, 74.
- ³² Saunders, 70.

³³ Coleman, 83-84.

³⁴ Saunders, 113.

³⁵ Saunders, 141.

³⁶ Saunders, 100-101.

³⁷ Saunders, 142.

³⁸ Saunders, 145 & 269.

³⁹ Saunders, 272.

⁴⁰ Saunders, 329.

⁴¹ Pells, 62.

⁴² Pells, 63.

⁴³ Pells, 95-98.

⁴⁴ Pells, 104.

⁴⁵ Operations Coordinating Board, *Progress Report Memorandum on PSB D-14c, 'Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France,' PSB D-15b, 'Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy,' D-38, 'A National Psychological Strategy Plan for Western Europe'*, March 1, 1954, <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>, 10.

⁴⁶ Saunders, 290.

⁴⁷ Saunders, 288.

⁴⁸ Pells, 214-217.

⁴⁹ Saunders, 284.

⁵⁰ Department of Defense, *Brief of Militant Liberty Project*, October 22, 1954, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 1.

⁵¹ Saunders, 285.

⁵² Saunders, 288-289.

⁵³ President's Committee on International Information Activities, "The Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities," June 30, 1953, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume II, National Security Affairs, Part 2* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1984), 1869.

⁵⁴ United States Information Agency, "Paper Prepared by the United States Information Agency," no date, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 National Security Affairs Part 2* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1984), 1763.

⁵⁵ United States Information Agency, "Paper Prepared by the United States Information Agency," 1768.

⁵⁶ National Security Council, *Appraisal of Key USIA Programs in Various Areas as of 6/30/55*, August 11, 1955, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 3.

-
- ⁵⁷ Pells, 84.
- ⁵⁸ National Security Council, *Appraisal of Key USIA Programs*, 9.
- ⁵⁹ National Security Council, *Appraisal of Key USIA Programs*, 11.
- ⁶⁰ Edward Rice-Maximin, "The United States and the French Left, 1945-1949: The View from the State Department," *Journal of Contemporary History* 19 (1984): 729-747. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/jstor/>, 735.
- ⁶¹ Rice-Maximin, 737.
- ⁶² Trevor Barnes, "The Secret Cold War: the CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946-1956. Part I," *The Historical Journal* 24 (1981): 399-415. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/jstor/>, 412.
- ⁶³ Trevor Barnes, "The Secret Cold War: the CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946-1956. Part II," *The Historical Journal* 25 (1982): 649-670. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/jstor/>, 660.
- ⁶⁴ William Colby and Peter Forbath, *My Honorable Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 105.
- ⁶⁵ Barnes, "The Secret Cold War, Part I," 413.
- ⁶⁶ Saunders, 67.
- ⁶⁷ Saunders, 155.
- ⁶⁸ U.S. Department of State, "Secretary of State Marshall to Paris, 27 August," August 27, 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 Vol III, Western Europe* (Washington D.C., GPO, 1974), 645-646.
- ⁶⁹ Rice-Maximin, 740.
- ⁷⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Diary 1021," August 12, 1954, in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, the Presidency: The Middle Way, XV* (Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 1245.
- ⁷¹ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c and the Evolution of the Cold War*, 32.
- ⁷² Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c: Psychological Operations Plan*, 21.
- ⁷³ Pells, 54.
- ⁷⁴ Barnes, "The Secret Cold War Part II," 660.
- ⁷⁵ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c/2 Background of LENAP Papers*, March 5, 1953, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 12.
- ⁷⁶ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c and the Evolution of the Cold War*, 5.
- ⁷⁷ Operations Coordinating Board, *Progress Report*, March 1, 1954, 1.
- ⁷⁸ White House, *CLOVEN and DEMAGNETIZE Coordinating Committee, First Report to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board*, May 8, 1952, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 6.
- ⁷⁹ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c/2 Background of LENAP Papers*, 18-21.

⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Ferguson) to the Secretary of State," February 11, 1952, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume VI Western Europe and Canada, Part II* (Washington D.C., GPO, 1986), 1153.

⁸¹ Hitchcock, 117.

⁸² U.S. Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)," July 13, 1954, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume VI Western Europe and Canada, Part II* (Washington D.C., GPO, 1986), 1431-1432.

⁸³ U.S. Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation by the Counselor of the Department of State," 1433-1434.

⁸⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Development of Guidelines for Propaganda Exploitation of the Results of the Berlin Conference to Further U.S. National Policies*, February 26, 1954, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 1-2.

⁸⁵ Operations Coordinating Board, *Meeting of the Working Group for D-38 and Related Matters on Thursday, February 25, 1954*, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 1-3.

⁸⁶ Operations Coordinating Board, *Meeting of D-38 Working Group March 5, 1954*, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 2.

⁸⁷ William White, "Dulles Threatens France and Italy with Loss of Aid," *New York Times*, June 5, 1954. [http://www.library.fsu.edu/Historical New York Times Database](http://www.library.fsu.edu/Historical>NewYorkTimesDatabase).

⁸⁸ White House, *U.S. Relations with Europe Outlined*, May 15, 1953, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 35.

⁸⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Summary Minutes of the Chiefs of Mission Meeting, London, September 24-26, 1952," October 2, 1952, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume VI Western Europe and Canada, Part I* (Washington D.C., GPO, 1986), 662-663.

⁹⁰ National Security Council, *NSC 5721/1 U.S. Policy on France*, September 30, 1957, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/>, 12.

⁹¹ National Security Council, *NSC 5433 Immediate U.S. Policy toward Europe*, September 16, 1954, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/>, 7.

CHAPTER 4: THE FRENCH REACTION

“Between a Sovietized Europe and the Atlantic empire, the latter solution is preferable, because in the first case enslavement would be certain, in the second case war would only be likely. If events trap us in this dilemma, we will choose the least terrible of these conclusions. But we should definitely not be trapped again. A third solution remains: that of a neutralized Europe.”

- Maurice Duverger, September 14, 1948¹

Although the French could not have specifically known the details of Top Secret PSB D-14c or the overall American anti-communist psychological campaign, they understood that American anti-communist concerns were inextricably intertwined with U.S. foreign policy during the Fourth Republic years. The French did respond in their own way to the elements of this campaign, sometimes knowingly, and at other times with unknowing reactions to the vague, yet persistent threat of American interference in French society. Indeed, the French reaction to the both the Marshall Plan and to the U.S. efforts in the field of defense are well-documented. The French reaction to the more “covert” aspects of the anti-communist campaign is not as easily discerned, but is evidenced through the public and private commentary of key government leaders as well as the leading newspapers of the era. Nonetheless, one consistent theme emerges from the French reaction to the American psychological campaign regardless of the secretiveness of the plan and its components; instead of blindly adopting all of the American “suggestions” made for both French domestic and foreign policy, the French governments of the Fourth Republic, in which there were many ardent anti-communists, examined each issue separately and responded to them with an objective of returning to France not only the power status it once enjoyed on the European continent, but its full sovereignty in the areas of foreign and domestic policy. In this respect French foreign policy was much more nuanced than American foreign policy for Europe and, at times, proved to be contrary to the black and white world of American Cold War imperatives.

In addition, the French had a different conception of the communist threat than did the United States. Communism in France was not a faceless “red” menace. Communists in France included among their ranks prominent authors and writers, trade union leaders and government

officials. These were also the same communists that were seen by many Frenchmen to be the saviors of the Republic against Nazism. Even so, the French governments of the Fourth Republic were certainly concerned with the power of the PCF and the potential of a Soviet invasion, and thus independently initiated a number of their own measures to counteract the influence of the PCF on French society. Consequently, as Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg argue, the French were actually closer to the United States on fundamental anti-communist policies than previously appreciated.² However, this belief was often lost on American policymakers at that time; even if the Truman and Eisenhower administrations believed that French policy was largely congruent with U.S. policy, they were still concerned enough about the impact that communism in France could have on U.S. interests in Europe to embark upon an extensive psychological campaign that was yet unprecedented in relations among traditional Western allies.

Although the French often agreed with American anti-communist policies, the French governments of the Fourth Republic, ever-mindful of their own internal situation, frequently deviated from the American foreign policy line by arguing for a different approach or a different timeline for a particular foreign policy issue, variations that the American government was often unable or unwilling to accept. Moreover, the French government also understood France's precarious geographic position between the Iron Curtain and the West. As a result, the French carefully balanced a desire to keep the Soviets contained with the need to ensure France's ultimate survival in a showdown between the two Cold War giants. Although the war-weary French were in desperate need of American assistance after the War, the Fourth Republic nonetheless charted its own path between the superpowers, often to the frustration of American officials. In doing so, the French remained valuable American allies, but not a compliant proxy as the Americans had hoped.

The European Recovery Program

Just one year after the Marshall Plan was launched, the French newspaper *Le Monde* still praised American generosity and lent credence to the American belief that the Marshall Plan was a crucial step in developing "mutual confidence not only between the free nations of Europe herself, but also between these nations and the United States."³ However, articles in *Le Monde* also highlighted a growing criticism of the Marshall Plan, generated in large part by the PCF, but also voiced by some French government officials. There were complaints that the Marshall Plan

would not pay for the all of the French recovery requirements and that it only amounted to 600 francs per month per capita. Moreover, there were complaints that American products, like coal, were more expensive than French products and that the Americans were seeking their own material gain out of the recovery program.⁴ These complaints, as made by the PCF, mirrored a Soviet desire to portray American aid as insufficient for France's needs and thus to dampen support for the American aid program.⁵ Conversely, French government officials voiced their complaints in the hope of increasing American financial assistance to France.

The French government was desperate for the American aid and was concerned about any communist attempt to sabotage the Marshall Plan. Vincent Auriol, the President of the Fourth Republic from 1947-1954, in a conversation with Paul Ramadier, warned the Prime Minister that PCF leader Jacques Duclos was certain to demand an explanation of the overall French economic policy and question the French dependence on the dollar. Auriol indicated that this was “a certain offensive against our relations with the United States, and this in connection with the anti-Marshall [Plan] offensive.”⁶ When Ramadier dismissed his concerns, Auriol told him that he was wrong “to not inform himself on the hidden side of communist politics.”⁷ French Ambassador to the United States Henri Bonnet, for his part, was worried about the success of communist propaganda on municipal officials throughout France. The communists had convinced many local mayors that the Marshall Plan caused shortages and unemployment. Bonnet relayed that it had taken him two hours to explain the contrary to them. Consequently, he recommended that the government undertake a propaganda campaign of its own in favor of the Marshall Plan.⁸ The French government linked PCF resistance to the Marshall Plan to the Soviets. The PCF, it argued, did not oppose the Marshall Plan out of personal conviction but because the Russians had rejected the proposal and they had been forced to follow the example of their Soviet benefactors.⁹

The French were also afraid that they must demonstrate a certain level of productivity required under the Marshall Plan, or risk the United States looking to Germany for the same products. They were quick to remind the United States of France's wartime devastation as well as to invoke Cold War imperatives by highlighting their precarious position between Eastern and Western Europe. In conversations with American officials, Auriol reminded the Americans that France had been ravaged by two wars and an occupation, yet it had enjoyed significant gains on the “fronts” of equipment, national defense and the reconstruction of the most devastated

regions. However, Auriol also pointed out that the French had suffered the repercussions of being in the middle of the Cold War battlefield between the Americans and the Russians. France would be on the front line in the event of a Russian attack.¹⁰

The French also tired of their portrayal in the American press as a “beggar,” a theme that reappeared in many of the French memoranda on U.S. aid.”¹¹ Auriol even connected anti-American sentiment in France with the French being made to feel like beggars by the United States.¹² Yet the French government recognized that the Americans did not want a Sovietized Europe and that the French had an interest in having the Americans on their side. Georges Bidault, who had served as both the French foreign minister and defense minister, himself said that there had never been “a finer, more far-sighted gesture in history than the Marshall Plan,” and that “American aid prevented the French economy from coming to a standstill.”¹³ However, numerous French political leaders, including Bidault and former Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, told U.S. officials that the French did not want to be treated like “vassals” and preferred to think of American aid as a contribution to the common defense of Europe.¹⁴

In spite of American dominance in Western Europe, the French were able nonetheless to capitalize on American anti-communist fears and secure American aid under the Marshall Plan even though they practiced economic policies that were often contrary to what American planners had envisioned. The Americans continued to release ERP counterpart funds in spite of their disapproval of French inflationary tactics. French officials adeptly reminded American ECA officials that the French government had undertaken their own anti-communist measures and thus expected full U.S. support.¹⁵ Moreover, “...all the French government had to do was to point to the unsavory alternatives of a communist or Gaullist government...”¹⁶ Consequently, American officials felt compelled to release Marshall Plan funds for fear that blocking them would harm the position of centrist French parties.

At the same time as the French argued for increased financial assistance under the ERP, they also began to look for alternative ways in which to proceed with French political and economic recovery. As Alan Milward argues, the French confined other concerns that they had on the “German issue” and began to seek a limited economic association with Germany.¹⁷ This included plans for a “Little European” customs union (which never came to fruition) and the Schuman Plan, which laid the groundwork for European integration. The French plan for a Franco-German economic alliance was a reflection of a French desire for an “economic balance

of power” with Germany and a response to American pressure for a free-trade framework under the ERP in which France would have been at a comparative disadvantage against a growing German economy.¹⁸ Consequently, “from the moment when Marshall Plan aid was offered...French policy toward Germany had also to be conceived in the light of an alternative Western European economic framework to that which the United States now wished to impose through the ERP.”¹⁹ Furthermore, Milward contends that Western Europe, through the European Payments Union and the European Coal and Steel Community, and not the Marshall Plan, laid the framework for reconstruction.²⁰ⁱ

After the Marshall Plan ended in 1952, and U.S. aid to France continued largely under military assistance programs, the French again sounded the alarm when they learned that the United States would not increase military aid as the French had requested. French Prime Minister Antoine Pinay said that it would be “a disastrous blow to [the] entire French economy and to programs and policies of the French government, both in domestic affairs and in the international defense situation.” He further warned that “this struck at the very heart of the present government’s program, which is to stabilize the economic situation, provide prospects of steady employment for the French population, and to combat Communism in the country.” Moreover, he indicated that this would be “a real blow to the government’s efforts to offset the communist propaganda against the French position in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”²¹ In addition, while the French government repeatedly acknowledged the American benevolence inherent in the Marshall Plan, they continually argued that it had only served to allay the costs of the war in Indochina (a war the French nonetheless willingly fought), with nothing left over for reconstruction, or rearming and reequipping its military forces.²²

National Defense

Once American aid shifted from the Marshall Plan and the European Cooperation Agency (ECA) to almost strictly military aid under the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), the French grew less enthusiastic about the American dollars flowing into France. One American official in France noted the difference in French reactions to U.S. foreign aid and explained the attitude shift in simple terms: “...a year and a half ago we were offering Western Europe

ⁱ For further discussion of Western European reconstruction and an appraisal of the Marshall Plan in Europe, see Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1984). Milward argues that “the Marshall Plan did not save Western Europe from collapse” and that the Western Europeans themselves created a “system of economic interdependence” which led to economic recovery and reconstruction.

tractors, food, and electric power plants, while we now offer them military aircraft and the prospect of increased military service.”²³ This official blamed the French for this attitude by implying that they had missed the point of the MSA as an extension of the programs begun under the Marshall Plan within the context of security. The results of this shift from the ECA to the MSA were the “flowering” of political neutralism as well as a growth of anti-Americanism. This took the form of adverse reactions to American troops and bases, as well as “increased anxiety over American belligerency and lack of flexibility in foreign affairs.”²⁴ The French government, for its part, claimed not to be neutral, but instead preoccupied with the costs of reconstruction and a war in Indochina, which required millions of soldiers and cost 450 million dollars per year. The French asserted that they no longer had any specific interest in Indochina, and that they fought the war there as the U.S fought in Korea for the interest of Western world as a whole, only they did it alone.²⁵ Pierre Mendès France, who became Prime Minister in 1954, believed that the fault of the French government lay in its undertaking of untenable engagements, particularly in Indochina, and stated that the French need to limit their engagements was the opposite of neutralism and was instead a display of loyalty to the NATO alliance.²⁶ The French argued that they were the pillars not only of Western defense efforts in Southeast Asia, but also within the European theater.²⁷ The French contended that they had sacrificed their officers and men (more than any of the allies), not for their own interests, but “to protect liberty in Asia, and at the same time, defend the liberty and security of Europe and the World.”²⁸ Furthermore, the French connected Indochina with the EDC. They did not believe that their preoccupation with Indochina should mean that Germany be favored over France in Europe.²⁹ Moreover, the French government was concerned that a defeat in Indochina would either bolster the case of the PCF which opposed the EDC, or result in a resurgence of French nationalism, which would also be hostile to the concept of a supranational EDC.³⁰

The French also attempted to tie a need for more military aid to the increased burdens brought on by the United States’ rearmament policy. In its February 24-25, 1952 edition, the French newspaper *Le Monde* ran the headline “The Supplementary Aid That We Will Obtain From The United States Will Not Be Enough To Resolve The Financial Difficulties Borne Of Rearmament.” The article recounted how the financial situation in France had “put the French political situation at stake” and threatened to derail the current political regime.³¹ Vincent Auriol further warned the United States that lack of continued U.S. aid and related offshore procurement

contracts could have the effect of pushing the French closer to the Russian “havre de paix,” and result in a moral triumph for the communists.³²

The French were also anxious about the American conception of NATO and an EDC that would include Germany. In private memoranda, some French leaders expressed anger and dismay at how the United States had favored German reconstruction. At the same time, the French did not wish to offend the United States and thus made efforts to mitigate the growing anti-Americanism that seemed to accompany such U.S. policies. The French desired solidarity among equal NATO partners, not a weakening of one at the expense of another.³³ Auriol equated the “problems” between the United States and France with the belief that the United States had forgotten that the Atlantic Pact was “an association of equals where common affairs must be debated in common and that the solidarity among allies must extend to those questions which, in affecting the essential interests of one ally, affect the interests of all.”³⁴ He argued that what had damaged Franco-American relations was “the attitude of the United States in not hesitating to go it alone in spite of the Atlantic Pact...” which caused many French to question why France should not strike out on its own policy path.³⁵

Additionally, in a conversation with British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Auriol indicated that the United States did not even understand Europe and that he wanted to U.S. officials to explain their true intent behind the Atlantic Pact and the EDC, why the Americans truly believed it was necessary to reinforce these mechanisms, and for what political purpose. He believed that the Americans were intent on favoring Germany over France.³⁶ Auriol would later outline his perception of the U.S. and NATO:

They [the Americans] have absolutely no human concern for France. They don't feel responsible to the Atlantic alliance, or to the traditional friendship between the two nations...they therefore play, without a doubt, the game of the communists; they weaken us, attack our pride and our power. This is contrary to the Atlantic Pact, and to our friendship.³⁷

Despite all of these complaints, however, NATO steadfastly remained the “cornerstone of French security.”³⁸

In response to American pressure to rearm Germany and include it within an integrated European framework such as the EDC, Jules Moch, the French Minister of Defense and a reliable American ally whose son had been executed by the Nazis, remarked at a dinner party with American officials in 1950 that Germany would be rearmed “over his dead body.”³⁹ In fact,

the French themselves had initially proposed (through the “Pleven Plan”) the creation of an EDC in order to limit what they perceived were the risks of a German policy centered on rearmament as was adopted by the NATO Council in 1950 and to delay rearming Germany until France could itself rearm.⁴⁰ Although the EDC treaty was signed in 1952, it had to be approved by the national parliaments. However, a debate soon ensued, and French support for the EDC declined in the wake of splits within the French government and American intransigence on the German issue.

Vincent Auriol argued that without the agreement of the British to join the EDC, it would become a Franco-German army in which the Germans would have superiority over France. The French feared a resurgence of German nationalism and revanchism that could accompany its reintegration into Western Europe. Auriol believed that a Franco-German army would lead in two years to a resurgence of “a nationalist and totalitarian Germany which would look to the side of the Russians.”⁴¹ François Seydoux, the director of the European Office in the Quai d’Orsay, remarked that “either the Soviets would be provoked into a preemptive strike against this new bulwark or, perhaps worse, Germany, once rearmed and the master of its destiny, might be drawn into an unholy alliance with the Soviets.”⁴² Moreover, Auriol held that the Pentagon was “dangerous” because it did not truly understand the situation in Europe and the peril associated with a resurgent Germany.⁴³ In response to a letter from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, Auriol wrote to Prime Minister René Pleven, Schuman, and Defense Minister Bidault that he believed that the Americans had not considered the possibility of a rapid rebirth of German nationalism, nor the creation of military associations headed by vanquished German generals demanding a return of German honor, nor the statements by German General Ramcke upon his release from a French prison that “We will soon give you German unity.”⁴⁴ Schuman himself said in late 1949 that although the French government was in favor of reintegrating Germany into a Western European framework, “the structure of Europe did not yet have the strength economically or politically to begin considering a security component” and that “those who suggested the formation of a European army were quite deluded.”⁴⁵ Auriol well-expressed the French position when he said that while the French had not forgotten the American intervention in the war, France also saw that nations like Germany continued to work and prosper while France, devastated by a war in which it was used as a battlefield, required the aid of all of its allies to rebuild.⁴⁶

Some in the French government further argued that the current form of the EDC would play into Soviet and PCF hands by appearing to the French public as a preparation for war against a Soviet propaganda of peace.⁴⁷ The PCF had launched its own campaign against NATO and the proposed EDC. What had begun as an argument against fiscal reform along American lines had evolved into a PCF battle against the Atlantic Pact with the rallying cry of “no military alliances, no military credits, no taxes.”⁴⁸ Georges Bidault, who indicated privately that he supported cooperation with U.S. policy, nonetheless argued that the French government could not afford to support U.S. policy on Germany for “internal political reasons.”⁴⁹ There were also those within the French government itself who accepted the Soviet position that they wanted peace and that the Americans were preparing for war. It was these same people who feared that a military alliance such as NATO or the EDC would provoke a strong Russian reaction.⁵⁰

Although there were many in the French government who initially opposed the idea of German rearmament and acceptance into an integrated European framework, the Cold War caused many of them to reconsider a German contribution to Western defense. Schuman himself indicated that “it would seem illogical for us to defend Western Europe, including Germany, without contributions from Germany.” However, he also made it clear that France had “a serious psychological problem regarding German rearmament” and should not be pressured to take immediate action on the issue.⁵¹ Schuman was also concerned that rearming Germany would provoke a violent Soviet reaction. As Michael Creswell argues, Schuman, who was not opposed in principle to German rearmament, believed “this move simply came at the wrong time.”⁵²

Georges Bidault, who also supported a rearmed integrated Germany in principle, called for circumspection on the German issue: “France must remember, but it must show mercy as well, and it must fear the sight of Germany becoming a pawn before it can choose its own destiny.”⁵³ However, Bidault warned that the Americans should be careful not to help the Germans “too fast and too much” because it would have “disastrous consequences” on Franco-American relations.⁵⁴ Indeed Bidault conducted some talks with the Americans on the German issue in secret because French public opinion as well as some members of the government were not yet for German rearmament or integration into a unified Western Europe.⁵⁵ Explaining to the Americans that the French government had to account for a domestic political situation that would make it “impossible for any French government to adopt an official policy of supporting the Anglo-Saxon powers against the Soviets in Germany,” Bidault nonetheless indicated French

government support for the American position on Germany and asked that the French be included in any discussions on the German question.⁵⁶ Bidault worried that the “impatience of the Americans” had not given French public opinion enough time to evolve.⁵⁷ As the French came closer to accepting a German army, they also attempted to leverage their position in Europe in order to gain more of an active role in the decision making process.⁵⁸

In 1950, the French government itself proposed the “Pleven Plan” which called for the creation of a supranational army along the same lines as the groundbreaking European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). However, this plan appears to have been hastily devised as a way to delay German rearmament.⁵⁹ This attempt at a French alternative to a German national army soon caused a decisive split in the government itself and a disconnect with French public opinion that was not ready to accept a remilitarized German state.⁶⁰ In yet another twist on the idea of a supranational army, Auriol suggested to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1951 that an international army guarantee the territorial integrity of Germany along the Rhine and Oder Rivers and that the United Nations supervise German neutrality, while guaranteeing them the complete freedom to conduct their own politics. He argued that this plan would confine the Russians to their own corner and mitigate the possibility of a resurgence of German nationalism.⁶¹ He also called for prohibiting the Germans not only from producing heavy arms, tanks and aircraft, which Britain and United States wanted to give them, but also from having their own army, and mandating that all of its forces be included in the EDC.⁶² These suggestions were later rebuffed by the United States as unnecessarily isolating Germany from the rest of occidental Europe.⁶³ By 1952, the “Pleven Plan” had evolved into the EDC, which the Americans came to support.⁶⁴ Although the French government signed the EDC treaty in May 1952, opposition within France to the current form of the EDC continued to mount.

For their part, French military leaders, who were both anti-fascist and anti-communist, overwhelmingly favored German rearmament in the face of potential Soviet aggression and argued that it would be impossible to oppose the Soviets without a German contribution.⁶⁵ Convinced of the Soviet threat, these uniformed leaders were largely supportive of the American proposal to create German divisions integrated under the command of NATO. These men sought to reconcile the necessity of German rearmament with the requirement that Germany not have a military force superior to that of France, nor a privileged position in the heart of a future EDC.⁶⁶ However, there remained a sizeable contingent within the French officer corps who worried that

it would be impossible to “revive” Germany without “resuscitating” a militant German state. Moreover, in supporting the American concept of German integration under a NATO framework, French military leaders also found themselves at odds with powerful elements within the government which rejected German rearmament.⁶⁷ In an attempt to find common ground with the government and the Americans, the French military chiefs agreed to participate in the elaboration of the EDC treaty.⁶⁸

Alphonse Juin, one of the great military leaders of France who supported the principle of a rearmed Germany, and General Blanc, the Chief of Staff of the French Army, soon became convinced that the EDC construct would throw the French Army into chaos and make it difficult for the French to fulfill its missions in Europe and overseas. They both argued that it was better to delay the EDC treaty until the situation in Europe and overseas had settled down.⁶⁹ By 1952, the war in Indochina convinced these same generals that the French would not be able to match German contributions to the EDC.⁷⁰ Without guarantees from the United States and Britain that they would maintain sufficient forces in Europe as a counterbalance, the French military chiefs determined that the EDC treaty was unacceptable in its then current form.⁷¹

The French government understood that the National Assembly, France’s Parliament, would never approve a Franco-German army without specific guarantees. They were also aware that the United States threatened to rearm Germany if France rejected the EDC. French officials also knew that the parliament would never accept placing all of its military forces under the EDC without being able to reserve some force for France’s own use and protection. The French government thus sought a number of guarantees from the United States including a place of prominence for France in European affairs and a promise to maintain an Anglo-American military commitment to NATO even after 20 years.⁷² Georges Bidault implied that if the Americans and the British could supply these guarantees, then they would be very close to an agreement on the EDC. However, Bidault also warned that, without guarantees, the EDC may fail.⁷³ President Auriol also suggested the alternative of an EDC comprised of the forces of the free nations of Europe which would leave those nations a part of their military for a national force. Juin himself opined that “one can merge iron and steel, but one cannot merge armies.”⁷⁴

In the end, with the French internally split on the EDCⁱⁱ, the French and American governments failed to find the common ground that both had so desired and the National Assembly rejected EDC treaty on August 30, 1954 by a vote of 264 in favor and 319 against.⁷⁵ American pressure and threats to withdraw U.S. support had backfired, leading many in France to doubt whether the United States would defend Europe in the event of an attack.⁷⁶ Those who opposed the EDC did so for a variety of reasons, ranging from a fear of German rearmament, to the desire to delay and keep the Americans committed in Europe, to the perception of the plan as having been forced upon them by the United States.⁷⁷ Above all, however, the French rejected the treaty because it did not, in its then current form, advance the national interests of the French.⁷⁸ The American plan to create an integrated Western defense against communism had suffered another setback. Later that same year, the French were able to establish a system more favorable to France that would integrate Germany under a NATO framework, despite American bitterness over the EDC and lack of interest in the “NATO solution.”⁷⁹

Covert Programs

Although the French reactions to the overt aspects of the American anti-communist psychological campaign are by far easiest to determine, the French also reacted consciously and often unconsciously to the covert aspects of the American program. The French knew about the existence and the mandate of the Psychological Strategy Board. In a conversation with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., President Auriol expressed concern that the West not be seen as the belligerents in the Cold War. In allaying Auriol’s fears, Senator Lodge told him that the Americans were “in the process of creating an organization called the Psychological Strategy Board, and that there is a fine man, Gordon Gray, who is in charge of it and will be surrounded with very intelligent men...” Lodge further told Auriol that he would speak to the board about the need to portray the West as desiring peace upon his return to the United States.⁸⁰ In response to the overall American anti-communist campaign, Auriol responded negatively, criticizing U.S. efforts to portray the West in a favorable light: “We appear in the Cold War to be bellicose and aggressive people. The Russians, who are dangerous themselves, appear as the apostles of peace.”⁸¹ By 1954, after U.S. relations with France had noticeably worsened over the failure of the French Parliament to ratify the EDC and growing French weariness of American attempts to

ⁱⁱ The Gaullists and Communists were joined in opposition to the EDC by a number of centrist deputies in the National Assembly.

dictate policy, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France asked American officials to restrict the American propaganda campaign and to stop subsidizing French publications.⁸²

Although the French did undertake a number of reforms in the governmental and political areas, as outlined in the PSB D-14c progress reports, they greatly resented the American suggestion that the French political system was flawed. Although the same complaints had been voiced by the Gaullists and Communists, the idea that the United States would dare to criticize France was much more difficult to bear. *Le Monde* routinely reported on the American perception of French governmental crises such as a *New York Times* article that referred to “the bankruptcy of the French spirit,” and suggested that these statements constituted “a danger, not only for French recovery efforts, but also for the French democracy and the position of France as a European power.”⁸³ Another *Le Monde* article suggested that France’s “American friends” be reminded that the negative attitudes and remarks made by the United States during the French government’s political turmoil were distressing. In particular, the article referred to statements made by American press agencies that indicated that the United States did not have confidence in nor respect for the French political system. In addition, the author referred to the French ability to denigrate themselves when it is required, but also included a line from *Cyrano de Bergerac* which summed up French sentiment: “I’ll take these [jabs] from myself with sufficient enthusiasm, but I’ll not permit another to say them to me”⁸⁴

The French response to the cultural aspects of the American anti-communist campaign was mixed. Many of the spectacles sponsored by the CCF provoked an outburst of French nationalism, at least from the French left. It seems the French, too, like the Americans behind the planning of the CCF’s cultural events, understood the link between the American-inspired cultural festivals and the U.S foreign policy agenda. As Richard Kuisel notes, many leftist French newspapers such as *Le Combat* derided these events as “NATO’s Festival” and sought to highlight America’s own maltreatment of its black citizens and the McCarthy witch hunts. Indeed, to many of the leftist newspapers, “it must have seemed that praising the festival meant, at least indirectly, also approving of NATO and German rearmament.”⁸⁵ However, leftist criticism of the CCF’s exhibitions was not indicative of the whole of the French population. Conservative newspapers touted these same festivals as “magnificent.”⁸⁶ For the most part, the French people enjoyed the American-inspired cultural events in France, but were not necessarily swayed by the inherent implication that American culture was on equal par with French culture.

The French reaction to U.S. efforts within the trade union field is somewhat murky. While the French government embraced U.S.-sponsored productivity programs, it also resented what it perceived as the below the board dealings of the American labor unions in France. Although it is impossible to discern just how much the French knew of the CIA's liaison with American labor, it is telling that Guy Mollet, French President du Conseil, when asked what the United States should do to lessen anti-Americanism, responded that "I have no objection to the actions of U.S. officials. However, unofficial Americans, [such] as my friend Irving Brown, cause us great trouble."⁸⁷

Public Opinion

The American anti-communist campaign only served to heighten French fears about American aggressiveness and cultural imperialism. Moreover, any American attempts to win over French public opinion began to ring hollow with the emergence of McCarthyism and the Rosenberg Affair. When questioned about the "weariness" of the French population with regard to the American invasion, Vincent Auriol explained that, on the contrary, the French felt a deep affection for the United States, and appreciated the fact that they saved France from ruin and genuinely desired to protect the French from a Soviet invasion. However, Auriol also described the French perception that the United States desired to determine the fate of France and of Europe and that this perception had created "a small inferiority complex."⁸⁸ The French population also appeared to be swayed by the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union. In 1954, many French deputies insisted on the need for a Big Four negotiation that would include the Soviet Union in spite of U.S. determination to exclude them.⁸⁹ As the Cold War intensified, Auriol remarked that French public opinion moved increasingly to the side of "campaigns of peace which respond to the state of mind of people exhausted and stricken by the horror of two wars which they have borne." Auriol further warned that "the campaigns of the Cold War would not be able to revive their enthusiasm."⁹⁰

Many of the gains that may have accrued from portraying the United States in a positive light were greatly damaged by American Senator Joseph McCarthy's vicious attacks on American communists and on the conduct of America's allies. Instead of portraying the Americans as desiring peace, it lent further credence to the French fear that the United States might instigate war to eliminate world communism.⁹¹ By the beginning of 1954, McCarthyism was the leading American story in the French press, with some newspapers reporting that 50

percent of Americans supported McCarthy's witch hunt. Furthermore, highly placed French officials indicated to U.S. embassy officials that McCarthyism was making anti-communism increasingly less popular and anti-communist measures more difficult to undertake.⁹² McCarthy also sent over two of his aides to examine USIA and embassy libraries, including the Paris offices, for "communist" books, which resulted in the outlawing of 300 books and the burning of 11 books. This act alone greatly undermined the American cultural effort and provoked unrelenting ridicule by the very French press and people that the American psychological campaign was targeting.⁹³ Jean-Paul Sartre, the famed French existentialist who had become a "fellow-traveler" of the PCF in 1952, summed up what many French, even those outside of the communist apparatus, thought in the wake of the Rosenberg trial and the Cold War:

Decidedly there is something rotten in America... You are collectively responsible for the death of the Rosenbergs, some for having provoked this murder, others for having let it be carried out; you have allowed the United States to be the cradle of a new fascism... One day, maybe, all this goodwill will heal you of your fear; we hope so because we have loved you. Meanwhile, don't be surprised if, from one end of Europe to the other, we scream: Watch out, America has rabies! We must cut all ties with it or else we shall be bitten and infected next.⁹⁴

In this respect the communists won a clear victory over the United States, as they succeeded in ensuring that "the orthodox communist version" of the Rosenberg ordeal prevailed in France, and arousing an almost unified sentiment among French communists and non-fellow travelers alike in support of the Rosenbergs and against the United States position.⁹⁵ Although the United States sought to counter this propaganda with its own accounting of the Rosenberg ordeal, it was too little too late.⁹⁶ From the outpouring of the Rosenberg trial was born a more effective and organized "neutralist" movement. The Soviets were a menace, but if the United States could do such a thing as condemn two "innocent" people to death amid anti-communist (and anti-Semitic?) hysteria, it was all the better for the French to forge their own way. The Rosenberg Affair provided fertile ground for a French populace already growing increasingly wary of American intervention in France. As Robert Glynn writes in his 1955 account of the Rosenberg Affair in France:

...below the surface in France there is a smoldering mass of hurt national pride at being pushed around by foreigners, and being 'occupied', at the threat of being involved in what they feel are other people's wars. The Rosenbergs were a focus for this angry frustration.⁹⁷

French Anti-Communism

While the Fourth Republic governments resented American dictation of policy and interference in French affairs, the French were driven by their own homegrown fear of communism and the power of the PCF within French political life. Georges Bidault personally wrote to Secretary of State George Marshall twice in 1948 “to point out to him that the Soviet menace now threatened the whole of Western Europe.”⁹⁸ As Chiarella Esposito argues, the Americans “were heartily encouraged [by the French] to come in with their dollars and fight for the common cause of anti-communism.”⁹⁹ The French government itself willingly initiated a number of its own anti-communist programs and reforms. In response to the Soviet peace campaign, the French government funded “Paix et Liberté,” an anti-communist organization founded by moderate French deputy Jean-Paul David. In addition to sponsoring radio programs, David also sponsored propaganda posters and distributed newsletters, brochures, pamphlets and stickers in order to counter the PCF’s successful billboard campaign, which used artwork such as Picasso’s famous peace dove in conjunction with the Soviet peace initiative.¹⁰⁰ Paix et Liberte’s “La Colombe qui Fait Boum” transformed Picasso’s peace dove into a Soviet tank.¹⁰¹ Another poster, “Soldat Russe,” depicted a menacing Russian soldier standing guard in front of a cemetery littered with crosses upon which Josef Stalin happily stood with his boot on a gravestone.¹⁰² In doing so, David sought to show “the truth” about the Soviet Union and the PCF. The French government also brought up the need for an “increased psychological effort” in support of NATO and asked the United States if it would receive David to discuss such an undertaking. Finally, the French government, as critical as it was of American anti-communist propaganda, was equally critical of French political parties that refused to mount their own concerted propaganda campaigns. Vincent Auriol himself expressed frustration over this lack of initiative and encouraged the French government to confront public opinion.¹⁰³

When David returned from a visit with the United States in 1952, he reported to Auriol that the United States held anti-communism as a condition for its support in other foreign policy areas, namely the French colonies. The French certainly recognized this fact but wanted to get something in return. In particular, Auriol believed that the Americans should help the French improve the way of life for the French workers. He rejected the American suggestion that police measures be taken against strikers because these measures would never find favor in public opinion. Auriol also believed that the United States had played into the communist hands in

rearming Germany and giving the impression of preparing for war which in turn caused the communist to gain ground on two points, “the preciousness of life,” and “worry for the future.”¹⁰⁴

In addition, the French government was also concerned by the presence of communists in sensitive government positions and determined to mitigate their influence in French affairs. Earlier, in 1947, French Prime Minister Paul Ramadier expelled the communist members of the cabinet. Later, Ramadier and his minister of interior, Jules Moch, would deny that the United States had played any part in the decision to dismiss the communists.¹⁰⁵ After subsequent communist expulsions, French Prime Minister Henri Queuille indicated in a meeting with the U.S. secretary of state that the French government was resolved to purge communists from positions of responsibility and pointed to the fact that the two communist members of the French national railroads, as well as communist members of nationalized industry boards who had committed or incited sabotage, had been fired.¹⁰⁶ In response to criticism over France’s “weak” reaction to communism and the presence of communists in government, Queuille urged caution and stated that it was necessary to carefully gather information that would demonstrate the complicity of certain leaders and to strike against those individuals against which there was the possibility of successful prosecution, rather than acting rashly and having to backtrack in the long run.¹⁰⁷

As noted in the previous chapter, the French government also outlawed various communist groups and organizations and at least attempted to amend electoral laws that had been favorable to the PCF and its representatives. In addition, the government cancelled performances of dancers from the Soviet Union to prevent anti-government demonstrations. Furthermore, the French leadership appeared to be legitimately alarmed when reports surfaced in 1952 that there were communists in certain state security functions and took steps to declare that employment in such positions was not compatible with membership in the PCF.¹⁰⁸ Finally, in May 1952, the government of Antoine Pinay seized upon the opportunity presented by the communist-inspired riots against American General Matthew Ridgway who took over for Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Pinay wanted to be done with the communists once and for all, and tried to discredit the PCF by arresting Party Secretary Jacques Duclos for allegedly using carrier pigeons to communicate during an illegal demonstration.¹⁰⁹

French anti-communism additionally manifested itself within their position on the German question. The French viewed the German issue within the context of a potential German-Russian alliance. André François-Poncet, who had been the French Ambassador in Berlin in the years leading up to the Second World War, warned that there were a sizeable number of German industrialists who would be tempted to lean toward the Soviet Union in the hopes of winning a war of revanchism. François-Poncet further argued that “this current exists and one must not treat it lightly.”¹¹⁰ In addition, Bidault expressed concern that the Russians would dominate a central German government and that the French would have “the Soviets on their frontiers.”¹¹¹ Furthermore, French officials worried that German rearmament might provoke a Soviet response, an argument they often used to delay rearming Germany.¹¹²

In dealing with the Russians, the French also refused to give ground or to renege on their European commitments. When the Russians mentioned that the West, and France in particular, were responsible for the poor international situation, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France resolutely reaffirmed France’s commitment to peace but “expressed the regret of not having discerned a similar attitude on the part of the Soviet government.” The French also refused to entertain Russian complaints about the aggressive nature of NATO.¹¹³

Although the French governments of the Fourth Republic were decidedly anti-communist, they worried about the prospects for another war. As a result, Fourth Republic France, while remaining firmly allied with the Western bloc, sought to find common ground with the Soviet Union. The French people believed that the Soviets were taking positive steps in coming to a peaceful coexistence with the West and were genuine in their offers to meet and openly discuss the issues of the day. French government officials believed that they could not ignore these efforts, in part because French public opinion would not understand such a refusal.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, the French reminded Washington of the importance of the opinion in Europe that wanted to conserve contacts with the Soviet Union.¹¹⁵ The French government also encouraged exchanges with the Soviet Union and often returned convinced of the Soviet desire for peace and détente.¹¹⁶ The French government believed that a negative Western attitude toward the Soviet Union could have grave consequences:

It would make it too easy for the Soviet Union to shift the emphasis from its own responsibilities and to make the masses, especially those in Asia and the Middle East, believe that the Soviet gestures of goodwill have met with Western rebuffs and that the Iron Curtain is really on the side of the West.¹¹⁷

Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France believed that a U.S. refusal to entertain Soviet proposals for a Big Four meeting would enliven debate in the French National Assembly and that the task of the French government would then be to act as a mediator between the two powers and pursue those policies which would bear fruit for the French.¹¹⁸ Auriol argued that the best policy toward the Russians was to “renew the bonds in private conversation...” but that “the Americans are driven by a fear of communism, the fear which plagues them...”¹¹⁹ The French were also greatly concerned by what they perceived as an American refusal to make good faith gestures. Gaston Palewski, the Vice President of the French National Assembly, once said, “They [the Americans] propose nothing that is acceptable to the Russians...I hesitate to say that too loud because I might be taken for a communist.”¹²⁰ Moreover, until the Americans provided concrete guarantees of a long-term commitment to the defense of France, the French government was less likely to directly antagonize the Soviet Union.¹²¹

French newspapers highlighted the French concern that American anti-communism, which was turning into a crusade, was also an instrument of American imperialism. Pierre Emmanuel, in a series of articles in *Le Monde*, wrote that U.S. anti-communism was “a pretext to expand [American] power.”¹²² Other journalists cited the need of the United States for air bases and for primary materials, none of which could be secured from Europe if communism were to take root there. Moreover, the United States was presented as using anti-communism as a way to blend its own idealist traditions with the exigencies of foreign policy. The United States could thus militate for the rights of men and a “universal cause” at the same time as it ensured access to primary materials. These same newspapers also exposed the paradoxical nature of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union which at the same time sought to avoid an agreement with the Soviets while avoiding a conflict with them. Moreover, the papers highlighted the American refusal to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union, and suggested that the time had come to ask whether the United States, which enjoyed disproportionate military power and material wealth, should be solely responsible for the security and prosperity of the world.¹²³

Maurice Duverger, in his *Le Monde* article “Le Communisme et L’Occident: La Grande Peur,” also criticized U.S. anti-communism, claiming that the fear of communism had deformed the political processes of Western Europe and pushed it to turn over its independence to the benefit of the United States, just as “the men of the Middle Ages accepted the suzerain’s

authority in exchange for his protection.” Duverger further argued that this fear was well-founded on the facts; however, he indicated that the error was not in feeling such a fear, but in abandoning nerve and reason instead of “a hard examination of how to prevent Europe from falling into a darkness such as the one that covered Europe in the four centuries after the fall of Rome.”¹²⁴

Toward Independence

The French governments of the Fourth Republic reacted to the American anti-communist psychological campaign with a nuanced foreign policy that treated each U.S. foreign policy initiative separately, rather than as a part of a blanket Cold War platform as espoused by the United States. The French government was anti-communist and wanted to contain the power of the Soviet Union. But Fourth Republic France existed within a completely different set of circumstances than did the United States. Nestled next to a potentially rearmed Germany and on the western frontier of the Iron Curtain, the French were not removed observers in the Cold War; they were in the thick of it. For that reason, the French government carefully charted its own path that would ensure France’s survival in the Cold War. The American campaign had unwittingly provoked such a reaction with the appearance and reality of a United States dictating policy to, and intervening in, the affairs of a traditional ally. Though the French were politically sympathetic to American Cold War concerns, they resented their perceived treatment as a “vassal” within an unequal partnership in which the United States was uncompromising and uninformed about the exigencies of France’s own political and foreign policy imperatives. As a result, although the French remained firmly aligned with the West, they began to move increasingly toward a foreign policy independent of their American ally and contrary to the goals of the American psychological campaign.

¹ Maurice Duverger, “Le Communisme et L’Occident,” *Le Monde*, September 14, 1948.

² Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, “France and the German Question,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, No. 3 (Summer 2003): 14.

³ “Un An de Plan Marshall,” *Le Monde*, March 5, 1949.

⁴ “Un An de Plan Marshall”

-
- ⁵ Vincent Auriol, "Mercredi 10 Mars," *Journal du Septennat, Tome II, 1948* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1974), 139.
- ⁶ Vincent Auriol, "Mardi 2 Septembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome I, 1947* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1970), 426.
- ⁷ Vincent Auriol, "Mardi 2 Septembre," 426.
- ⁸ Vincent Auriol, "Jeudi 21 Avril," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome III, 1949* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1977), 203.
- ⁹ Vincent Auriol, "Vendredi 31 Octobre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome I, 1947* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1970), 506.
- ¹⁰ Vincent Auriol, "Mercredi 8 Decembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome II, 1948* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1974), 568.
- ¹¹ Vincent Auriol, "Mardi 16 Decembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 805.
- ¹² Vincent Auriol, "Jeudi 15 Janvier," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VII, 1953-1954* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1971), 18.
- ¹³ Georges Bidault, *Resistance*, trans. Marianne Sinclair (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), 151.
- ¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, "The Ambassador in France (Caffrey) to the Secretary of State," June 21, 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume III Western Europe* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1974), 454. and Vincent Auriol, "Jeudi 15 Janvier," 18.
- ¹⁵ Chiarella Esposito, *America's Feeble Weapon*, 53-54.
- ¹⁶ Chiarella Esposito, 119.
- ¹⁷ Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1984), 468.
- ¹⁸ Hitchcock, *France Restored*, 4.
- ¹⁹ Milward, 468-469.
- ²⁰ Milward, 470.
- ²¹ U.S. Department of State, "The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State," July 25, 1952, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume VI Western Europe and Canada Part I* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1986), 1234-1235.
- ²² Vincent Auriol, "Mardi 16 Septembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 560.
- ²³ Office of the Special Representative in Europe, *Letter to Mr. Thomas Durrance of the MSA from Robert Schmid or the OSRE*, July 10, 1952, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu /servlet/DDRS>, 4.
- ²⁴ Office of the Special Representative in Europe, "Letter to Mr. Thomas Durrance," 4.

²⁵ Auriol, "Jeudi 22 November," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome V, 1951* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1975), 562-563.

²⁶ Pierre Mendès France, "Lettres à Nos Allies Américains sur L'Indochine," April 19, 1954, in *Oeuvres Complètes, Part II Une Politique de l'Économie 1943-1954* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), 507-508.

²⁷ Vincent Auriol, "Mardi 6 Mai," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 309-310.

²⁸ Vincent Auriol, "Samedi 25 Octobre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 663.

²⁹ Antoine Pinay, as paraphrased in Jenny Raflik, "Les Dissensions Franco-Américaines face à la Politique Indochinoise de la France, 1950-1954," Paper presented at a colloquium sponsored by the University of Florida, February 2005, 6.

³⁰ Raflik, 9.

³¹ "L'Aide Supplémentaire Que Nous Obtiendrons Des Etats-Unis Ne Suffira Pas À Résoudre Les Difficultés Financières Nées Du Réarmement," *Le Monde*, February 24-25, 1952.

³² Vincent Auriol, "Lundi 28 Juillet," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 463.

³³ Vincent Auriol, "Mardi 16 Septembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 560-561.

³⁴ Vincent Auriol, "Jeudi 13 Novembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 718.

³⁵ Vincent Auriol, "Mercredi 12 Novembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 715.

³⁶ Auriol, "Mardi 16 Decembre," 805.

³⁷ Vincent Auriol, "Mardi 7 Octobre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 602.

³⁸ Bidault, *Resistance*, 169.

³⁹ Jules Moch, as quoted in Richard D. McKinzie, "Second Oral History Interview with Theodore C. Achilles, Washington, D.C., December 18, 1972," *Truman Presidential Museum and Library*, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/achilles.htm#93>.

⁴⁰ Bernard Pujo, *Juin: Marechal de France* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), 281. and Michael Creswell, "With a Little Help from our Friends: How France Secured an Anglo-American Continental Commitment, 1945-1954," in *Journal of Cold War History* 3, no. 1 (October 2002): 10.

⁴¹ Vincent Auriol, "Jeudi 29 Novembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome V, 1951* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1975), 577.

⁴² François Seydoux, as paraphrased in Hitchcock, 117.

⁴³ Vincent Auriol, "Mardi 4 Decembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome V, 1951* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1975), 586.

⁴⁴ Vincent Auriol, “Annexe V, L’Armee Europeene et le Pacte Atlantique: lettre de D. Acheson a M. Schuman du 9 Aout 1951 et Le Note pour Monsieur le President du Conseil, ” in *Journal du Septennat, Tome V, 1951* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1975), 646.

⁴⁵ Robert Schuman, as paraphrased in Hitchcock, 119.

⁴⁶ Vincent Auriol, “Lundi 17 Mars,” in *Journal du Septennat, Tome I, 1947* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1970), 144.

⁴⁷ Vincent Auriol, “Annexe V, ” 647.

⁴⁸ Vincent Auriol, “Vendredi 3 Decembre, ” in *Journal du Septennat, Tome II, 1948* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1974), 557.

⁴⁹ Creswell and Trachtenberg, 10.

⁵⁰ Vincent Auriol, “Mardi 29 Mars,” in *Journal du Septennat, Tome III, 1949* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1977), 171.

⁵¹ Robert Schuman, as quoted in Hitchcock, 140.

⁵² Michael Creswell, “Between the Bear and the Phoenix: The United States and the European Defense Community, 1950-54,” *Security Studies* 11, no. 4 (Summer 2002): 101.

⁵³ Bidault, *Resistance*, 143.

⁵⁴ Bidault, *Resistance*, 156.

⁵⁵ Bidault, *Resistance*, 159.

⁵⁶ Creswell and Trachtenberg, “France and the German Question,” 10.

⁵⁷ Bidault, *Resistance*, 160.

⁵⁸ Hitchcock, 143-144.

⁵⁹ Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 110-111.

⁶⁰ Hitchcock, 134.

⁶¹ Vincent Auriol, “Mardi 4 Septembre,” in *Journal du Septennat, Tome V, 1951* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1975), 646.

⁶² Auriol, “ Mardi 4 Decembre,” 586-587.

⁶³ Auriol, “Jeudi 22 November,” 561.

⁶⁴ Hitchcock, 155.

⁶⁵ Pierre Guillen, “Les Chefs Militaires Français, Le Réarmement de l’Allemagne et la CED (1950-1954),” *Revue d’Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et de Conflits Contemporains* 129 (1983): 3.

⁶⁶ Guillen, 8.

-
- ⁶⁷ Guillen, 5.
- ⁶⁸ Guillen, 9.
- ⁶⁹ Guillen, 17.
- ⁷⁰ Guillen, 19.
- ⁷¹ Guillen, 23.
- ⁷² Creswell, "Between the Bear and the Phoenix," 114.
- ⁷³ Creswell, "With a Little Help from our Friends," 17-18.
- ⁷⁴ Alphonse Juin, as quoted in Pujo, 301.
- ⁷⁵ Pujo, 309.
- ⁷⁶ Creswell, "With a Little Help from our Friends," 20.
- ⁷⁷ Hitchcock, 171.
- ⁷⁸ Hitchcock, 10.
- ⁷⁹ Creswell and Trachtenberg, "France and the German Question," 26.
- ⁸⁰ Vincent Auriol, "Mardi 4 Septembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome V, 1951* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1975), 427.
- ⁸¹ Vincent Auriol, "Jeudi 27 Novembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 751.
- ⁸² Wall, 276.
- ⁸³ Maurice Ferro, "La Presse Américaine Continue de Juger Sévèrement la Crise Française," *Le Monde*, September 1, 1948.
- ⁸⁴ Remy Roure, "Confiance et Respect," *Le Monde*, September 14, 1948.
- ⁸⁵ Kuisel, 28.
- ⁸⁶ Kuisel, 28.
- ⁸⁷ Guy Mollet, as quoted in Department of the Army, *ALO 382 Message from SACEUR Paris France from Gruenther to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C.*, March 12, 1956, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 2.
- ⁸⁸ Vincent Auriol, "Jeudi 22 Novembre," 562.
- ⁸⁹ "No. 308, M. Mendès-France, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à M. Henri Bonnet, Ambassadeur de France à Washington," November 2, 1954, in *Documents Diplomatiques Français 1954 (21 Juillet – 31 Décembre)* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987), 640.
- ⁹⁰ Vincent Auriol, "Mercredi 12 Novembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 716.

⁹¹ U.S. Department of State, "The Ambassador of France (Dillon) to the Department of State on the Decline of French Confidence in U.S. Leadership," April 4, 1954, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume VI, Western Europe and Canada, Part 2* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1986), 1373.

⁹² U.S. Department of State, "Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Hanes) to the Secretary of State on a Summary of Paris Cable 3623," April 3, 1954, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume VI, Western Europe and Canada, Part 2* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1986), 1405-1406.

⁹³ Pells, *Not Like Us*, 81.

⁹⁴ Jean-Paul Sartre, as quoted in Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, 50.

⁹⁵ Robert Glynn, "L'Affaire Rosenberg in France," *Political Science Quarterly* 70 (1955): 506.
<http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/jstor/>.

⁹⁶ Glynn, 516.

⁹⁷ Glynn, 521.

⁹⁸ Bidault, 155.

⁹⁹ Esposito, xxiv.

¹⁰⁰ Princeton University Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, "Paix et Liberté Exhibit,"
http://infoshare1.princeton.edu/libraries/firestone/rbsc/mudd/online_ex/paix/.

¹⁰¹ *La Colombe Qui Fait Boum*, no date, Paix et Liberté Papers; Cabinet 5, Drawer 9; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library, http://infoshare1.princeton.edu/libraries/firestone/rbsc/mudd/online_ex/paix/.

¹⁰² *Soldat Russe*, no date, Paix et Liberté Papers; Cabinet 5, Drawer 9; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library, http://infoshare1.princeton.edu/libraries/firestone/rbsc/mudd/online_ex/paix/.

¹⁰³ Vincent Auriol, "Jeudi 27 Novembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 751.

¹⁰⁴ Vincent Auriol, "Mardi 19 Fevrier," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 135.

¹⁰⁵ Philip F. Dur, "Ambassador Caffery and the French Alliance," *The Ambassador Jefferson Caffery Web Site*, <http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/~pfd2009/>.

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," November 18, 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 Volume III, Western Europe* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1974), 679.

¹⁰⁷ Henri Queuille, as paraphrased in Vincent Auriol, "Mercredi 24 Novembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome II, 1948* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1974), 541.

¹⁰⁸ Vincent Auriol, "Vendredi 5 Septembre," in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978), 537.

¹⁰⁹ Kuisel, 49.

¹¹⁰ Andre François-Poncet, as paraphrased in Vincent Auriol, “Mardi 8 Fevrier,” in *Journal du Septennat, Tome III, 1949* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1977), 103-104.

¹¹¹ As quoted in Creswell and Trachtenberg, 12.

¹¹² Creswell and Trachtenberg, 21.

¹¹³ “Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères aux Représentants Diplomatiques de France à Londres, Washington,” August 27, 1954, in *Documents Diplomatiques Français 1954 21 Juillet – 31 Décembre* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987), 221-222.

¹¹⁴ “M. Chauvel, Ambassadeur de France à Londres, à M. Pinay, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,” June 14, 1955, in *Documents Diplomatiques Français 1955, Tome 1 1 Janvier- 30 Juin* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987), 773.

¹¹⁵ “M. De Lagarde, Consul Générale de France à New York, à M. Mendès-France, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,” November 26, 1954, in *Documents Diplomatiques Français 1954 21 Juillet- 31 Décembre* (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1987), 800.

¹¹⁶ “No. 433, Note de la Sous-Direction d’Europe Orientale,” December 20, 1955, in *Documents Diplomatiques Français 1955, Tome II 1 Juillet-31 Decembre* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1988), 963.

¹¹⁷ “No. 433, Note de la Sous-Direction d’Europe Orientale, ” 964.

¹¹⁸ “No. 308 M. Mendes-France , Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. Henri Bonnet, Ambassadeur de France a Washington, ” 640.

¹¹⁹ Vincent Auriol, “Samedi 11 Juillet,” in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VII, 1953-1954* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1971), 284.

¹²⁰ As quoted in Vincent Auriol, “1 Octobre 1953,” in *Journal du Septennat, Tome VII, 1953-1954* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1971), 448.

¹²¹ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 74.

¹²² Kuisel, 44.

¹²³ Bertrand de la Salle, “Evolution de la Psychologie Américaine, II. – Y a-t-il un Imperialisme Américain? ” *Le Monde*, April 27-28, 1947.

¹²⁴ Maurice Duverger, “Le Communisme et L’Occident: La Grande Peur,” *Le Monde*, September 13, 1948.

CONCLUSION

As the Fourth Republic drew to a close, the American anti-communist psychological campaign in France largely lapsed into obscurity, a result of an American realization that the campaign was less successful in molding the French into compliant allies as U.S. officials had hoped. This campaign, as embodied in the Psychological Strategy Board's PSB D-14c, endeavored to create an environment in France that would be more receptive to U.S. Cold War foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, the psychological campaign aggressively pressured the French, both covertly and overtly, to adhere to the U.S. Cold War imperative of a unified Western Europe against Soviet expansionism, which included the interrelated elements of the Marshall Plan, the EDC, NATO, and a rearmed and integrated Germany. In doing so, it sought to minimize the power of the PCF, which the United States believed was the major threat to U.S. initiatives in France, by intervening in the political and governmental processes of the Fourth Republic and showcasing American cultural prowess in an attempt to win over French public opinion. This anti-communist psychological campaign was thus a central factor that conditioned Franco-American relations in the early Cold War era and well-into the latter half of the twentieth century.

U.S. psychological planners failed to account for the exigencies of France's own domestic and foreign policy and adopted an anti-communist-or-nothing approach to its campaign and its policies affecting France. For their part, the French governments of the Fourth Republic were essentially anti-communist in nature; however, they were also very mindful of their tenuous hold on power and as well as France's own unique foreign policy concerns, which included neighboring a former bitter enemy and an understanding that they would serve on the front lines in any future conflict between the Soviets and the West. Consequently, the French charted their own way both out of necessity and a growing weariness of the Cold War and American intervention in France. In this respect the American campaign had failed as the French moved further towards neutralism in the Cold War and away from an American-dictated foreign policy.

The American Assessment

American officials themselves came to realize that the U.S. campaign had a number of crucial flaws. Unsatisfied by the results that PSB D-14c was having, U.S. officials continually tinkered with the administration and conduct of the U.S. anti-communist campaign in France. In June of 1953, just over two years after the creation of the Psychological Strategy Board and a year and a half after the approval of PSB D-14c, the President's Committee on International Information Activities reported to President Eisenhower the unsurprising conclusion that PSB regional plans, such as the one for France, were really "plan[s] for the achievement of national aims involving the use of propaganda, diplomacy, economic pressure and military strength in various combinations."¹ The interrelatedness of the various elements of the plan had caused much controversy between the PSB and the planning agencies of the other U.S. departments who competed for oversight of the areas affecting their own departments.²

In addition, as Gregory Mitrovich has suggested, the Americans had a difficulty in reaching a consensus on the United State's overall Cold War doctrine, a fact that effectively split U.S. officials and put the status of psychological warfare as a viable Cold War weapon in jeopardy.³ For this reason, among others, the Committee believed that "the Psychological Strategy Board was improperly conceived and that it [had] not, under its charter, been able to contribute materially to the national effort," and recommended that it be abolished in favor of a new Operations Coordinating Board which would coordinate "departmental execution of approved national security policies."⁴ Moreover, the acknowledgement by the Eisenhower administration as early as 1953 that the aggressive "rollback" of Soviet influence and power may not be feasible (and could be dangerous) in light of Soviet nuclear capabilities and its subsequent adoption of a policy of "peaceful coexistence" further weakened the rationale behind an aggressive anti-Soviet "psywar."⁵

American officials also conceded the impossibility of scientifically evaluating the plan because of the numerous other factors that undoubtedly influenced the trend of communism in France in addition to the implementation of PSB D-14c. Instead, U.S. planners pointed to an "intuitive approach" which asked "whether the provisions of the plan were consistent with what we knew or know now of French communism" and suggested that planners "make various abstract hypotheses which [could be] related to the concrete difficulties found in the implementation of the plan."⁶ Furthermore, successive reports on the effectiveness of PSB D-

14c indicated a feeling on the part of U.S. officials that the plan had not fully taken the French situation into consideration. In the spring of 1953, the Paris Committee in charge of coordinating implementation of PSB D-14c in France indicated that the plan seemed “more appropriate as a checklist for actions which may or may not be practical at the moment for the French government to undertake rather than a blueprint for specific actions...”⁷ American officials further acknowledged that,

...the plan did not rest on a careful analysis of the vulnerabilities of the Communist Party in France, and that many aspects of the psychological motivations which are fundamental for an understanding of a development of communism in France were not taken into account by the authors of the plan.⁸

American officials additionally recognized the conflict between the objectives of “defense against the military threat of communism” and “defense against communism as a subversive influence.”⁹ American planners began to think that the U.S. preoccupation with the “military threat of the Soviet Union [led]...to a variety of measures which...can be easily depicted as aggressive...” and thus fueled the image of the American “war-monger.”¹⁰ American officials further admitted that assigning priority to the military goals of the MSA and NATO programs may have prevented the improvement of the economic and social conditions in France.¹¹ Finally, PSB members acknowledged that many of the recommendations of the plan had not taken “French psychology” into account and that many of these actions had backfired.¹² By mid-1953, U.S. officials confessed in private circles that “anti-communism is unpopular in France.”¹³

The American Anti-Communist Psychological Campaign and French Public Opinion

The American anti-communist campaign failed to contribute to the realization of American Cold War foreign policy imperatives. Namely, the campaign failed to garner support for the foremost U.S. policy initiatives during this period. The EDC was rejected by the French Parliament in August of 1954. Instead of becoming more staunch NATO allies, the French began to question the existing NATO framework and American and British dominance in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the French opposed certain aspects of U.S. plans to rearm Germany and sought to obstruct many measures that might have allowed for a resurgence of German independence and nationalism. The French also refused to accept an American position on the Soviet Union that discounted the possibility of negotiated settlements. Finally, in attempting to win over French public opinion to the American perspective, the American

campaign further pushed a wary French populace closer to Cold War neutralism and a more independent foreign policy.

As early as late 1952, an Office of the Special Representative in Europe paper on public opinion trends in Europe, which included data from public opinion surveys in France, England, Western Germany and Italy, reported that while mass opinion supported the Western effort in the Cold War, a majority of the continental respondents indicated that they believed that their country would become a battlefield in the event of a war, and that they would “lose” no matter who actually won the war. This argument was central to the growing European neutralist argument and especially resonated among a French population that had already served as a battleground in two major wars within the last 40 years. The report also indicated that while there had not been an increase in the percentage of unfavorable replies, there had also been no noted increase in favorable replies and that “an unmistakable shift was noted away from favorable and towards ‘undecided’ responses.”¹⁴

In 1953, a status report on the overall American psychological program reported that developments in Western Europe had been “characterized by a disappointing deterioration in the attitudes towards the U.S.” and that “non-communist press and public opinion in Western Europe [have] reflected mounting criticism of U.S. foreign policy...and alleged anti-communist hysteria.”¹⁵ The report further indicated that “these unfavorable attitudes, in combination with a generally more receptive reaction among Western European peoples to the Soviet ‘peace offensive’ now constitute[d] an intensification of anti-American feeling among significant elements of European opinion.”¹⁶ This report recognized that this increased receptiveness to the Soviet “Peace Offensive” had impeded U.S. progress with respect to a number of its foreign policy objectives, including NATO, the EDC, and European integration. Finally, the report begrudgingly acknowledged that the Rosenberg trial and McCarthyism had contributed to an increase in neutralism in France.¹⁷

Another report that same year also pointed to an ebbing of respect for American policies in France and listed several major causes for the loss of U.S. prestige. Among those causes listed was a “Declining Fear of the Soviet Union” and the perception that the Soviets had learned their lesson from the guerrilla war in Greece, the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and the 1950 invasion of South Korea and had not undertaken any comparable aggressive actions since 1950.

Therefore, U.S. claims that the Soviet threat was growing were considered to draw from ulterior

motives. The United States was reducing its own arms budget, a fact which suggested to Europeans that the United States did not totally believe in the imminence of a Soviet threat.¹⁸ The report additionally listed a “Distrust of American Leadership” as another reason for loss of American prestige. In particular, Europeans thought that the United States acted with “impatience and impetuosity,” and with an “all-or-nothing approach in the East-West conflict.”¹⁹

McCarthyism was listed as another cause of a decline in public opinion on the United States. Given the perceived deferential treatment McCarthy received from the Eisenhower administration, the European public increasingly viewed him as exercising an unhealthy influence over American foreign policy, especially in light of his attacks on U.S. trade policy and successful pressuring of the State Department over its personnel policy as well as its administration of the overseas information program.²⁰ The report also listed American economic policies and the failure of the United States to lower its own trade barriers as having harmed American standing in Europe. Finally, the report enumerated a number of “Miscellaneous Lesser Factors,” that diminished U.S. prestige, including “suspected American interference in domestic politics,” “...failure to achieve the higher standard of living expected from the Marshall Plan,” and “statements by Congressmen and private citizens which Europeans consider to be offensive to them.”²¹

By 1955, the French were expressing doubt as to whether NATO provided a viable defense mechanism for France. In a discussion with the American Ambassador in Paris, French politician Michel Debré argued that he believed that the opinion of most Frenchmen was that “NATO was the wrong kind of alliance in the wrong place.”²² Debré further explained that the French viewed NATO as a security pact designed to prevent Soviet aggression. He asserted that because the majority of the French did not believe that the Soviet aggression was likely, they were not interested in such a limited alliance.²³ A survey of European public opinion released in December 1955 following the Foreign Ministers Conference further identified that “support for the NATO alliance, as a viable security system, is not firmly rooted in public allegiance.”²⁴ Specifically, almost one half of the French polled appeared to favor troop withdrawal by both the United States and the Soviet Union from the European continent.²⁵ Furthermore, more French supported either the arrangement of a new general security system including Russia (31 percent)

ⁱ It is unclear whether Debré relied on polling data of his own in representing the opinion of the average Frenchman in this case. Ambassador Douglas Dillon indicated that he believed that Debré’s views were “representative of a large body of French opinion” with regard to NATO. (U.S. Department of State, *October 22, 1955 Telegram*, p. 1).

or outright neutrality (21 percent) over continuing the present scheme for Western defense centered on NATO (18 percent).²⁶ In addition to the questions on NATO, the 1955 survey also indicated that half of the French polled believed that the United States had not gone far enough in making concessions at the Foreign Ministers Conference. The poll further showed that one-third of respondents did not believe that the United States was doing all that it could to prevent a war.²⁷ An equal percentage (one-third) of Europeans indicated that both Russia and the United States were to blame for the tension between the two superpowers.²⁸

By 1957, the U.S. campaign in France had largely ended and French opinion on the United States reflected a continued decline since 1954 at the same time as hostility toward the Soviet Union appeared to wane. In France, the majority polled in a USIA survey believed that neither the United States nor the Russians were making any serious effort toward general disarmament and the banning of atomic tests. Additionally, French feelings of mutual interest with the United States had also declined.²⁹ Furthermore, net ratings (favorable opinions minus unfavorable) for the United States were lower in France than in any other polled country at plus-11 percent.³⁰ The French also demonstrated net unfavorable ratings on the United States peace efforts.³¹ There was a high plus-50 percent French view of European integration by 1957, which had been one of the United States' objectives during its anti-communist psychological campaign; however, it is more likely that this rating was a by-product of the campaign itself and reflected a French desire to forge "a greater degree of independence from the U.S. through a united Europe."³² About half of the French respondents in these polls indicated that they felt that "the basic interests of their country and those of the United States [were] either 'rather different or very different.'³³ A majority of the French also indicated that they believed that they were not equal partners with the United States.³⁴

When asked about whether they should be on the side of the West *or* on the side of the East *or* on neither side, a central question and concern of the American anti-communist campaign in France, the French registered overwhelmingly in favor of "neither side" from 1954-on.³⁵ The French also showed a negative balance when questioned about "the effectiveness of NATO as a defense organization for West Europe."³⁶ When asked whether their confidence in NATO [had] gone up or down lately, the French "down" replies greatly outnumbered the "up" replies.³⁷

The Battle for Men's Minds and the Failure of the American Campaign

In the end, the U.S. campaign failed to have the effect desired by American officials. While it was true that the popularity of communism in France had declined by the end of the Fourth Republic, it was probably more due to the PCF's own bungled responses to world events such as the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and its rigid adherence to a Stalinist line even after Soviet Communist Party leader Nikita Khrushchev himself had acknowledged its deficiencies. The United States had failed to demonstrate the cause and effect relationship between French communism and a reluctance to embrace U.S. foreign policy initiatives. As the U.S. campaign intensified, the French of the Fourth Republic, who had been staunch U.S. allies and were anti-communist in their own right, became increasingly wary of U.S. intervention and sought more independence from the United States. The French resentment over U.S. interference and anti-communist hysteria in the early and mid-Fourth Republic years was further exacerbated by Franco-American differences on colonial issues. In particular, while the Americans fumed over the rejection of the EDC, the French felt especially bitter over America's perceived abandonment of the French cause in Indochina.³⁸ Furthermore, the French were infuriated by the American "betrayal" in the Suez Crisis, a conflict not only about Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, but also about his support and aid for the Algerian rebels fighting the French in North Africa.ⁱⁱ

American officials often blamed French governmental instability for the lack of progress in the anti-communist agenda. However, American policymakers had failed to consider the demands of French domestic and foreign policy that dictated that France chart its own path between the Cold War superpowers. A war-weary French populace would not have allowed for an aggressive foreign policy agenda that risked provoking another world war. Although the French remained generally aligned with U.S. policy in Europe, they did not do so unconditionally or with blanket acceptance of the American Cold War platform, and they sought to carve out a more independent and leading role for themselves in European affairs. As much as they appreciated American assistance, the French quickly grew tired of being criticized and lectured by U.S. officials. As Frank Costigliola argues, "Washington's program of psychological

ⁱⁱ For more on France, Algeria and the United States see Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Irwin Wall, *France, the United States and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). For more on France, Indochina, and the United States see Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture, *End of a War: Indochina 1954* trans. Alexander Lieven and Adam Roberts (New York: Praeger, 1969).

warfare in France... may have exacerbated the irritation Americans and French felt for each other.”³⁹ The American anti-communist psychological campaign in France not only shaped U.S.-French relations in the Fourth Republic; it also had the unintended by-product of alienating America’s longstanding ally and driving a wedge in Franco-American amity that would affect their relationship for years to come.

¹ President’s Committee on International Information Activities, “The Report of the President’s Committee on International Information Activities,” June 10, 1953, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume II, National Security Affairs, Part 2* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1984), 1855.

² President’s Committee on International Information Activities, “The Report of the President’s Committee on International Information Activities,” June 10, 1953, 1855.

³ Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin*, 98.

⁴ President’s Committee on International Information Activities, “The Report of the President’s Committee on International Information Activities,” June 10, 1953, 1855.

⁵ Mitrovich, 145.

⁶ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c and the Evolution of the Cold War*, 6.

⁷ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c/2, Background of LENAP Papers*, 5.

⁸ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c/2, Background of LENAP Papers*, 7.

⁹ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c/2, Background of LENAP Papers*, 9.

¹⁰ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c/2, Background of LENAP Papers*, 9.

¹¹ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c/2, Background of LENAP Papers*, 10.

¹² Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c/2, Background of LENAP Papers*, 11.

¹³ Psychological Strategy Board, *PSB D-14c/2, Background of LENAP Papers*, 21.

¹⁴ National Security Council, *The Mutual Security Program: Public Opinion Trends in Western Europe*, September 26, 1952, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu /servlet/DDRS>, 2.

¹⁵ National Security Council, *No. 8 – The Psychological Program*, June 30, 1953, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu /servlet/DDRS>, 1.

¹⁶ National Security Council, *No. 8 – The Psychological Program*, 1.

¹⁷ National Security Council, *No. 8 – The Psychological Program*, 3.

¹⁸ White House, *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad*, September 11, 1953, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu /servlet/DDRS>, 4.

-
- ¹⁹ White House, *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad*, 5.
- ²⁰ White House, *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad*, 6.
- ²¹ White House, *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad*, 7.
- ²² U.S. Department of State, *October 22, 1955 Telegram*, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 1.
- ²³ U.S. Department of State, *October 22, 1955 Telegram*, 1.
- ²⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Opinion Trends in the Aftermath of the Foreign Ministers Conference Regarding Western Europe, Asia, the Near East, Africa, Latin America, and the Sino-Soviet Bloc*, December 30, 1955, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 28.
- ²⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Opinion Trends*, 23.
- ²⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Opinion Trends*, 26.
- ²⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Opinion Trends*, 13.
- ²⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Opinion Trends*, 14.
- ²⁹ United States Information Agency, *Post-Crisis Opinion in Western Europe*, August 15, 1957, <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>, 1.
- ³⁰ United States Information Agency, *Post-Crisis Opinion in Western Europe*, 5.
- ³¹ United States Information Agency, *Post-Crisis Opinion in Western Europe*, 9.
- ³² United States Information Agency, *Post-Crisis Opinion in Western Europe*, 13.
- ³³ United States Information Agency, *Post-Crisis Opinion in Western Europe*, 15.
- ³⁴ United States Information Agency, *Post-Crisis Opinion in Western Europe*, 17.
- ³⁵ United States Information Agency, *Post-Crisis Opinion in Western Europe*, 19.
- ³⁶ United States Information Agency, *Post-Crisis Opinion in Western Europe*, 21.
- ³⁷ United States Information Agency, *Post-Crisis Opinion in Western Europe*, 21.
- ³⁸ Raflik, "Les Dissensions Franco-Américaines," 12.
- ³⁹ Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance*, 245.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

- Auriol, Vincent. *Journal du Septennat, Tome I, 1947*. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1970.
- Auriol, Vincent. *Journal du Septennat, Tome II, 1948*. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1974.
- Auriol, Vincent. *Journal du Septennat, Tome III, 1949*. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1977.
- Auriol, Vincent. *Journal du Septennat, Tome V, 1951*. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1975.
- Auriol, Vincent. *Journal du Septennat, Tome VI, 1952*. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1978.
- Auriol, Vincent. *Journal du Septennat, Tome VII, 1953-1954*. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1971.
- Barrett, Edward. *Truth is Our Weapon*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1953.
- Bidault, Georges. *Resistance: A Political Biography of Georges Bidault*. Translated by Marianne Sinclair. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967.
- Bruce, David. "Telegram from the Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State." October 7, 1949. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/>.
- Central Intelligence Agency. "Document 307: Memorandum for the File." November 16, 1948. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*. www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/intro7.html.
- Central Intelligence Agency. *Information Report: Communist Control over French Working Class*. June 6, 1951. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Central Intelligence Agency. *Information Report: Strikes and Communist Tactics (France)*. April 20, 1951. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Central Intelligence Group. *Memorandum for the President*. November 26, 1946. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Colby, William, and Peter Forbath. *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978.

- Coombs, Philip. *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
- Department of the Army. *ALO 382 Message from SACEUR Paris France from Gruenther to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C.* March 12, 1956. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.
- Department of Defense. *Brief of Militant Liberty Project*. October 22, 1954. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.
- Dillon, Douglas. "Letter to John Foster Dulles." June 16, 1955. *Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1952-1959; North African Subject Series*. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Dulles, John Foster. "Memorandum of Conversation." July 13, 1954. *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers as President of the United States 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman Files): Dulles-Herter Series*. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Dulles, John Foster. "Memorandum of Conversation after Dinner with Chancellor Adenauer (Bonn)." September 16, 1954. *John Foster Dulles Papers: Germany Subject Series*. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *The Eisenhower Diaries*. Edited by Robert H. Ferrell. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, the Presidency: The Middle Way, XIV*. Edited by Louis Galambos and Daun Van Ee. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, the Presidency: The Middle Way, XV*. Edited by Louis Galambos and Daun Van Ee. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, the Presidency: The Middle Way, XVI*. Edited by Louis Galambos and Daun Van Ee. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, the Presidency: The Middle Way, XVII*. Edited by Louis Galambos and Daun Van Ee. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961*. Washington, D.C: GPO, 1960.

Kirkpatrick, Helen. "Memorandum to Mr. C.D. Jackson on the NATO Psychological Effort and French Initiative." May 22, 1953. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

La Colombe Qui Fait Boum, no date, Paix et Liberté Papers; Cabinet 5, Drawer 9; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library, http://infoshare1.princeton.edu/libraries/firestone/rbsc/mudd/online_ex/paix/.

Le Monde, January 1947-December 1957.

McKinzie, Richard D. "Second Oral History Interview with Theodore C. Achilles, Washington, D.C., December 18, 1972." *Truman Presidential Museum and Library*. <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/achilles.htm#93>.

Mendès France, Pierre. "Letter to Monsieur Joseph Laniel, President du Conseil." May 21, 1954. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

Mendes France, Pierre. *Oeuvres Completes, Part II Une Politique de l'Economie 1943-1954*. Paris: Gallimard, 1985.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1954*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1954, Annexes*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1955, Tome I*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1955, Tome II*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1988.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1955, Annexes Tome I*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1955, Annexes Tome II*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1988.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1956, Tome I*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1988.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1956, Tome II*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1989.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1956, Tome III*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1990.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1957, Tome I*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1990.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1957, Tome II*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1991.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1958, Tome I*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1992.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1958, Tome II*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1993.

National Security Council. *Appraisal of Key USIA Programs in Various Areas as of 6/30/55*. August 11, 1955. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.

National Security Council. *Current Policies of the Government of the United States of America Relating to National Security, Volume 1: Geographical Area Policies*. November 1, 1952. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

National Security Council, “Document 253: Memorandum from the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the Members of the National Security Council, NSC 4-A.” December 9, 1947. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*. www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/intro7.html.

National Security Council, “Document 288: Note by Executive Secretary (Souers) to the National Security Council, NSC 10/1.” June 15, 1948. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/intro7.html.

National Security Council. *The Mutual Security Program: Public Opinion Trends in Western Europe*. September 26, 1952. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.

National Security Council. *No. 8 – The Psychological Program*. June 30, 1953. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.

National Security Council. *NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*. April 14, 1950. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

National Security Council. *NSC 5412/2: Covert Operations*. December 28, 1955.

National Security Council. *NSC 5433 Immediate U.S. Policy toward Europe*. September 16, 1954. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/>.

- National Security Council. *NSC 5721/1 U.S. Policy on France*. September 30, 1957. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/>.
- National Security Council. *A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on the Office of Special Projects*. June 15, 1948.
- National Security Council. *A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on the Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-directed World Communism*. March 30, 1948. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- New York Times*, January 1947-December 1957.
- Norberg, Charles. "Memorandum for Mr. Walter M. Walmsley, Mr. Townsend Hoopes, and Mr. Samuel Berger on a Project for a Research Center on Communism in France." August 13, 1952. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Norberg, Charles. "Memorandum for Record: Outlawing the French Communist Party." September 11, 1953. Psychological Strategy Board. *U.S. Doctrinal Program*. June 29, 1953. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Norberg, Charles. "Office Memorandum to the Executive Officer, OCB on Background Notes for OCB Meeting May 12." May 12, 1954. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Office of the Special Representative in Europe. *Letter to Mr. Thomas Durrance of the MSA from Robert Schmid of the OSRE*. July 10, 1952. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.
- Operations Coordinating Board. *Meeting of D-38 Working Group March 5, 1954*. March 8, 1954. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Operations Coordinating Board. *Meeting of the Working Group for D-38 and Related Matters on Thursday, February 25, 1954*. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.
- Operations Coordinating Board. *Memorandum for Mr. Elmer B. Staats, Executive Officer from Charles Norberg*. June 22, 1954. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Operations Coordinating Board. *Memorandum for Record of the Meeting of Western Europe Working Group, May 20, 1954, 2:15 P.M., 708 Jackson Place, N.W.* May 24, 1954. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- Operations Coordinating Board. *Progress Report Memorandum on PSB D-14c, "Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France," PSB D-15b, "Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy," D-38, "A*

National Psychological Strategy Plan for Western Europe.” March 1, 1954.
<http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

Operations Coordinating Board. *Progress Report Memorandum on PSB D-14c, “Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France,” PSB D-15b, “Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy,” D-38, “A National Psychological Strategy Plan for Western Europe.*” March 31, 1954.
<http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

Princeton University Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library. “Paix et Liberte Exhibit.”
http://infoshare1.princeton.edu/libraries/firestone/rbsc/mudd/online_ex/paix/.

Psychological Strategy Board. *Panel C: Plan A.* November 6, 1951.
<http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS?locID=tall28252>.

Psychological Strategy Board. *PSB D-14c and the Evolution of the Cold War.* July 16, 1953.
<http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS?locID=tall28252>.

Psychological Strategy Board. *PSB D-14c: Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France.* January 31, 1952. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

Psychological Strategy Board. *PSB D-14c/2 Background of LENAP Papers.* March 5, 1953.
<http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.

Psychological Strategy Board. *Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Reduction of Communist Power in France (Code Name: Cloven/Midiron) Annex A.* November 1, 1951.
<http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

Psychological Strategy Board. *Third Report to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board with Regard to the Implementation of PSB D-14c “Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France”.* January 26, 1952. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

Psychological Strategy Board. *U.S. Doctrinal Program.* June 29, 1953. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

Soldat Russe; n.d., Paix et Liberté Papers; Cabinet 5, Drawer 9; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.
http://infoshare1.princeton.edu/libraries/firestone/rbsc/mudd/online_ex/paix/.

Tauey, Charles. “Memorandum to Dr. Horace Craig on Positive Actions within the Framework of the French and Italian Plans.” September 18, 1953. . <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

- Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope*. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956.
- Truman, Harry S. *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*. Edited by Robert H. Ferrell. New York: Harper & Row, 1980.
- Truman, Harry S. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945-1952/53*. Washington D.C. GPO, 1961-1966.
- USARMA Paris. "Telegram C-14 to Secretary of State." March 4, 1956. *Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President, White House Central Files (Confidential File), 1953-61*. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- U.S. Department of State. *Development of Guidelines for Propaganda Exploitation of the Results of the Berlin Conference to Further U.S. National Policies*. February 26, 1954. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.
- U.S. Department of State. *European Recovery Program, Country Studies: Chapter V France 1948*, no date.
- U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume III, Western Europe*. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1974.
- U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Volume IV Western Europe*. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1975.
- U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume III Western Europe*. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1977.
- U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume I National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy*. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1979.
- U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume II National Security Affairs, Part 2*. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1984.
- U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume VI Western Europe and Canada, Part 1*. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1986.
- U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume VI Western Europe and Canada, Part 2*. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1986.
- U.S. Department of State. *French and Italian Elections*. July 6, 1951. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.

- U.S. Department of State, *Intelligence Report No. 5945: French Policies and Practices in Algeria*. June 1, 1952. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- U.S. Department of State. *Intelligence Report No. 6140: The French Communist Party: Its 1952 Record and Prospects for 1953*. December 30, 1952. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/itweb/tall28252?db=DDRS>.
- U.S. Department of State. "Introduction." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergency of the Intelligence Establishment*, www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/intro7.html.
- U.S. Department of State. "The Marshall Plan Website." <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/57.htm>.
- U.S. Department of State. *October 22, 1955 Telegram*. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.
- U.S. Department of State. *Opinion Trends in the Aftermath of the Foreign Ministers Conference Regarding Western Europe, Asia, the Near East, Africa, Latin America, and the Sino-Soviet Bloc*. December 30, 1955. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.
- U.S. Department of State. *A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on French North Africa*. May 28, 1948.
- United States Information Agency. *Post-Crisis Opinion in Western Europe*. August 15, 1957. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.
- White House. *CLOVEN and DEMAGNETIZE Coordinating Committee, First Report to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board*. May 8, 1952. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.
- White House. *Paper Entitled Status Report on the work of the Panel C of the Psychological Strategy Board*. November 27, 1951. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS?locID=tall28252>.
- White House. *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad*. September 11, 1953. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.
- White House. *U.S. Relations with Europe Outlined*. May 15, 1953. <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/servlet/DDRS>.

Secondary Sources

- Aderath, M. *The French Communist Party, a Critical History (1920-84): From Comintern to 'the Colours of France'*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.

- Backman, Rene, Franz-Olivier Giesbert, and Oliver Todd. "What the CIA is Looking For in France." In *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf. Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart Inc., 1978.
- Barnes, Trevor. "The Secret Cold War: The CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946-1956, Part 1." *The Historical Journal* 24, no. 2 (1981): 399. www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/search/.
- Barnes, Trevor. "The Secret Cold War: The CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe 1946-1956, Part II." *The Historical Journal* 25, no.3 (1982): 649. www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/search/.
- Coleman, Peter. *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe*. New York: The Free Press, 1989.
- Connelly, Matthew. *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Costigliola, Frank. *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance, 1940-1990*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992.
- Creswell, Michael. "Between the Bear and the Phoenix: The United States and the European Defense Community, 1950-54." *Security Studies* 11, no. 4 (Summer 2002): 89.
- Creswell, Michael. "With a Little Help from Our Friends': How France Secured an Anglo-American Continental Commitment, 1945-54." *Cold War History* 3, no. 1 (October 2002): 1.
- Creswell, Michael and Marc Trachtenberg. "France and the German Question: 1945-1955," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 5.
- Creswell, Michael and Marc Trachtenberg. "Rejoinder: New Light on an Old Issue." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 43.
- Dur, Philip F. "Ambassador Caffery and the French Alliance." *The Ambassador Jefferson Caffery Web Site*. <http://www.ucslouisiana.edu/~pfd2009/>.
- Esposito, Chiarella. *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994.
- Fauvet, Jacques. *Histoire du Parti Communiste Francais, II: Vingt-Cinq Ans de Drames, 1939-1965*. Paris: Fayard, 1965.
- Gardner, Roy. "The Marshall Plan Fifty Years Later: Three What-Ifs and a When." In *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, edited by Martin Shain. New York: Palgrave, 2000.

- Glynn, Robert. "L'Affaire Rosenberg in France." *Political Science Quarterly* 70, no. 4 (1955): 498.
- Guillen, Pierre. "Les Chefs Militaires Français, Le Réarmement de l'Allemagne et la CED (1950-1954)." *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et des Conflits Contemporains*, no. 129 (1983): 3.
- Harrison, Michael. *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security*. Baltimore and London: The Johns-Hopkins University Press, 1981.
- Hitchcock, William. *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954*. Chapel Hill, N.C. and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
- Hogan, Michael J. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. *The CIA and American Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
- Jones, Joseph M. *The Fifteen Weeks (February 21 – June 5, 1947)*. New York: The Viking Press, 1955.
- Knapp, Andrew. *Parties and the Party System in France: A Disconnected Democracy?*. Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004.
- Kriegel, Annie. *The French Communists: Profile of a People*. Translated by Elaine Halperin. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972.
- Kuisel, Richard. *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Micaud, Charles. *Communism and the French Left*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963.
- Milward, Alan S. *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951*. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1984.
- Mitrovich, Gregory. *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000.
- Morris, Bernard. "Communist International Front Organizations: Their Nature and Function." *World Politics* 9 (1956): 84. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu>.
- Pells, Richard. *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II*. New York: Basic Books, 1997.

Porch, Douglas. *The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995.

Pujo, Bernard. *Juin: Marechal de France*. Paris: Albin Michel, 1988.

Raflik, Jenny. "Les Dissensions Franco-Américaines face à la Politique Indochinoise de la France, 1950-1954." Paper presented at a colloquium sponsored by the University of Florida, February 2005.

Rice-Maximin, Edward. "The United States and the French Left, 1945-1949: The View from the State Department." *Journal of Contemporary History* 19 (1984): 729. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/jstor/>.

Saunders, Frances. *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*. New York: The New Press, 2000.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-63*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Wall, Irwin. *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Susan M. Perlman

Susan McCall Perlman is a Master of Arts Candidate in International Affairs at Florida State University in Tallahassee, Florida. Her thesis topic is the U.S. Anti-Communist Psychological Campaign in France during the Fourth Republic. Susan also earned a Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs and French in 1998 from Florida State University. In addition to her distinction as a Summa Cum Laude graduate, Susan was inducted into the Phi Beta Kappa, Phi Kappa Phi, Golden Key and Phi Eta Sigma Honor Societies. She was also honored during her undergraduate years as the Top Graduate of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps. In addition, she was named the 1997 French Department Undergraduate of the Year and was a 1997 recipient of the Winthrop-King Undergraduate Scholarship for study abroad in Paris.

Upon graduation from Florida State University in 1998, Susan was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Air Force. In 1999, she was named the Top Graduate of the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Officer Course at Goodfellow AFB, Texas. After leaving Goodfellow, Susan was assigned to the 614th Space Operations Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, California, as the Deputy Intelligence Flight Commander. There she directed operational intelligence activities in support of Air Force Space Forces mission planning and execution and oversaw the production of intelligence summaries and foreign space reliance assessments. In May 2000, Susan was assigned to the 51st Operations Support Squadron, Osan AB, Republic of Korea, as the Deputy Chief of Intelligence Operations. In this capacity, she provided intelligence support to two combat-ready squadrons of A-10 and F-16 fighter aircraft including threat situation, current intelligence, and mission briefings. In June 2001, Susan was assigned to the 42nd Airborne Command and Control Squadron, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, as an Airborne Intelligence Officer Instructor onboard the EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center aircraft. There she supervised an airborne intelligence staff which monitored ongoing tactical air and ground situations, provided real time targeting inputs to meet theater commander objectives, and relayed threat warning to high-value assets. In October 2002, Susan was assigned to the 612th Air Intelligence Squadron (612 AIS) as the Chief of Air and Air Defense Analysis, where she led a team of air and air defense analysts responsible for regional threat assessments and direct intelligence support to the Commander, U.S. Southern Air Forces, as well as humanitarian, counterdrug and counterterrorism missions in South America. In March 2003, Susan was named Chief of the U.S. Southern Air Forces Intelligence Operations Center, where her staff provided timely, fused and tailored intelligence and maintained visibility on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance asset operations in the U.S. Southern Command area of operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Later that year she was promoted to the position of Assistant Director of Operations for the 612 AIS, where she led 150 intelligence specialists and oversaw planning and implementation of force protection and air/air defense analysis, collection management, targeting, and signals and imagery intelligence exploitation, as well as training in support of contingency operations. In December 2003, Susan left active duty to pursue a Master's Degree and joined the U.S. Air Force Reserve. Since December 2003, Susan has served as the Deputy Intelligence Flight Commander, 33rd Operations Support Squadron, Eglin AFB, Florida, where she assisted in the oversight of three squadron intelligence

operations and 30 intelligence personnel. She is currently the Executive Officer for the 39th Flying Training Squadron at Moody AFB, Georgia.

Susan has received a number of professional awards throughout her military career, including the 612th Air Intelligence Squadron and Group Company Grade Officer of the Year in 2002 and the 39th Flying Training Squadron Company Grade Officer of the Year in 2005. She has been named Company Grade Officer of the Quarter in various squadrons five times between 2000 and 2005, and has gone on to earn honors as the Group and Wing Company Grade Officer of the Quarter on three occasions. In addition to being the “Top Graduate” from the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Officer Course in 1999, Susan was a “Distinguished Graduate” from the Airborne Intelligence Officer Course in 2001. In 2001, she was also honored as a “Superior Performer” in the Pacific Air Forces Operational Readiness Inspection at Osan AB, Republic of Korea. Susan has been awarded a number of military decorations including the Meritorious Service Medal, Air Force Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Air and Space Campaign Medal, National Defense Medal, the Outstanding Unit Award, and the Korean Service Medal.

In addition, Susan holds a number of professional certifications and has had training in the following: EC-130E Instructor Airborne Intelligence Officer Course, USAF Combat Survival School, USAF Water Survival School, Contingency and Wartime Planning Course, Information Warfare Applications Course, and the Joint Aerospace Command and Control Course. Finally, Susan maintains military linguist qualifications in French.

Upon completion of her Master’s Degree program, Susan would like to pursue a PhD in History or International Affairs, and continue her focus on U.S. foreign policy.